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Abstract: 
 
International law has developed what many might consider a constitutional understanding of individual 
civil rights that individuals can claim vis-a-vis their own governments. This paper discusses the 
development of aspects of international law relating to civil rights, and argues that if this body of law is 
meaningful we should see evidence of links between acceptance of international legal obligation and 
domestic practices. Recognizing that external forms of enforcement of civil rights is unlikely (because not 
generally in the interest of potential "enforcers"), I argue that international civil rights treaties will have 
their greatest effect where stakeholders - local citizens - have the motive and the means to demand treaty 
compliance. This is most likely to be the case not in stable autocracies, where such demands are likely to be 
crushed, nor in stable democracies, where the motive to mobilize is attenuated due to rights saturation, but 
in transitional countries where the expected value of mobilization is maximized. Thus, I test the hypothesis 
that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is likely to have its greatest positive effects in 
transitional countries - those that have had some fleeting experience with democratic governance. This 
proposition is tested quantitatively with indicators for freedom of religious practice, fair trials and the death 
penalty. The proposition is weakly supported by extremely stringent statistical models that control for the 
endogeneity of the treaty commitments, country and year fixed effects, and other obvious influences on 
civil rights practices. I conclude that the International Bill of Rights has the power to influence the direction 
of rights practices in fluid political situations, but cannot magically transform autocracies into liberal 
guarantors of civil liberties. Still, these effects are important, and the most we can expect from scraps of 
paper which the international community has been reluctant to enforce. 
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Civil Rights in International Law:  
Compliance with Aspects of the ‘International Bill of Rights’ 
 
 
Scholars, international lawyers and activists have grown accustomed to the claim that an 
identifiable set of international instruments constitute “The International Bill of Rights.”
1  The 
Universal Declaration for Human Rights (UDHR)
2 along with two binding treaties, the 
International Covenant for Civil and Politic Rights (ICCPR)
 3 and the International Covenant for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
4 have come to be thought of as international 
society’s clearest expression of a core set of human rights commitments with “constitutional” 
status in international law.  The purpose of this paper is not to contest the claim of these 
agreements’ constitutionalism.  Rather it is to ask whether the promulgation of the rights 
contained in these agreements over past five decades has contributed to their realization.  
Empirically, what has the “International Bill of Rights” contributed to the realization of these 
rights around the world? 
The emphasis of this paper is empirical, but it is based on several theoretical claims.  
First, the ratification of human rights agreements can stimulate domestic demands for their 
realization that certain governments might find costly to recognize or to cope with. Groups begin 
to form to demand their rights once these are formally acknowledged by governments through 
ratification, though the incentives to mobilize will differ predictably across different kinds of 
political regimes.  Furthermore, the greater groups’ ability to monitor the government, the greater 
will be the pressures to comply with international legal obligations protecting civil rights.  There 
is some evidence that the “International Bill of Rights” has contributed to an improvement in 
certain civil rights practices, around the world, largely because of the public commitment 
ratification requires.  Ratification stimulates demands for compliance, making it harder than it 
would otherwise be for a government to ignore international civil rights norms.    
The paper is organized as follows.  The first section provides some background and 
discusses the place of civil rights in international law.  The second section provides some 
                                                 
1  Among many sources, see Henkin 1981. 
2  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A 
(III) of 10 December 1948.  Text at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.  
3   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.  Text can be 
found at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm.  
4   International Covenant on Economic, Social andCultural Rights. Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into 
force 3 January 1976.  Text at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm.  3 
theoretical justification for expecting treaties to influence civil rights and potentially other human 
rights practices.  The remaining sections are empirical and test the proposition that treaty 
ratification – focusing on the ICCPR and its optional protocol relating to the death penalty – have 
had a significant “commitment effect.”  The pattern of evidence supports the idea that this effect 
is conditional.  It is strongest where domestic groups have both the motive and the means to make 
civil rights demands of their government. Furthermore, it is strongest in cases in which the right 
in question is centrally violated and relative easy to detect and monitor.  I compare the evidence 
across three civil rights areas: freedom of religion, fair trials, and the death penalty.  The key 
finding is that international legal obligations make an important and positive difference to 
practices in these three areas, but the greatest differences are to be found where citizens have the 
capacity and motivation to mobilize and for rights that are most easily observed and monitored.  
 
I.  Background: Civil Rights and International Law 
 
Civil and political rights were one of the first areas to be addressed by the international 
human rights treaty regime that was negotiated in the mid-1940s.  Along with economic and 
social rights, they were the central core – the first 19 articles – of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, passed unanimously by the General Assembly in 1948.  But for reasons that have 
been discussed elsewhere
5 – foot dragging, notably by the major powers – it took 18 years to 
agree upon a binding treaty covering civil and political rights, and to then negotiate its contents 
(despite the fact that most of its provisions were already contained in the Universal Declaration 
itself).
6   At the insistence of the United States, a move was made to bifurcate the social and 
economic rights on the one hand from the civil and political on the other.  The ICESCR contains 
the codification in treaty form of the former, while the latter are encoded in the ICCPR.  The 
ICCPR, along with the ICESCR and the Universal Declaration, are often referred to collectively 
(if loosely) as the “International Bill of Rights.”
7   
The ICCPR is the primary global treaty devoted to what people have come to call “first 
generation” human rights.
8  These are the complex of “Enlightenment rights” that in their day 
were crucial in overthrowing feudalism and shattering the uncontested divine right of kings.
9  
                                                 
5  Simmons forthcoming: ch. 2. 
6   See Articles 3-21 of the UDHR.  Many scholars also hold that at least some of the obligations found in 
the ICCPR reflect customary international law.  See Henkin 1995.   
7   Ibid.   
8   The delineation of civil and political rights as “first generation human rights” has become standard 
terminology.  See for example, Encyclopædia Britannica 2007; Ishay 2004: 3. 
9   Ishay 2004: 7. 4 
Infused with Enlightenment notions of individualism and laissez-faire, this first generation of 
rights with their focus on the rights of the individual vis-à-vis political authority has come largely 
to be thought of as a set of “negative rights,” or rights that require government to abstain from 
denigrating (rather than requiring governments to intervene on behalf of) human dignity.   
In large part, the emphasis on “negative freedoms” can be seen in the ICCPR’s Part III, 
which contains the treaty’s substantive obligations.
10  Individuals have a right to their lives 
(Article 6), to be free from torture or degrading treatment (Article 7), from slavery or servitude 
(Article 8), a right to liberty and security of person (Article 9), the right to free movement (Article 
12), to a fair trial (Article 14), freedom of religion and thought (Articles 18 and 19), peaceful 
assembly and free association (Articles 21 and 22).  Rights of political participation are 
guaranteed in Article 25.  Equality before the law and minority rights are protected in Articles 26 
and 27.  But the treaty suggests positive rights of individuals as well.  “Each state Party to the 
present convention,” according to Article 2(1), “undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
convention, without distinctions of any kind…” The treaty thus contains an affirmative obligation 
of states to organize civil and political life in ways that make the enjoyment of the rights 
contained in the treaty possible.   
The drafters of the treaty did not, however, envisage that these rights would be absolute; 
both the ICCPR
11 and the Universal Declaration
12 recognize that these rights may need to be 
limited when necessary to protect certain public interests.
13   Many states reinforce and specify 
their rights of derogation through the use of reservations.
14  Some – China with respect to 
freedom of religion is an outstanding example – provide for the civil freedoms contained in the 
ICCPR in their domestic law, but then take back the guarantee with domestic derogations that are 
much broader than the  ICCPR itself allows.
15   Many civil rights – citizens’ rights vis-à-vis the 
state – raise culturally sensitive controversies about the proper relationships between the 
                                                 
10   The text of the ICCPR can be accessed at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm (accessed 
15 July 2003). 
11   ICCPR, Article 4. 
12   UDHR, Article 29(2). 
13   In 1985, The Economic and Social Council negotiated a set of principles defining the conditions onder 
which derogation of ICCPR treaty obligations are in fact allowed.  See United Nations, Economic and 
Social Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (1985); 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/siracusaprinciples.html.  
14  The North African countries tend to make “states of emergency claims” for purposes of derogation; see 
Allain and O'Shea 2002: 90. 
15   Kolodner 1994: 484. 5 
individual, society, and the state.
16  Ideological differences drove East and West to spar over civil 
rights during the Cold War.  Today, civil rights are among those most likely to be dismissed as 
“western.” 
In order to facilitate enforcement of these obligations, the ICCPR established the Human 
Rights Committee (Article 28),
17 whose main purpose is to enhance the mechanisms of 
accountability through its authority to monitor and receive state reports that are due on a regular 
basis.  The Human Rights Committee is also empowered by the convention to consider 
complaints of one state against another (Article 41), although this process has never been used.  
The Committee is also empowered, through the first Optional Protocol, to consider individual 
complaints against one’s own government.
18 Although the Human Rights Committee was 
established expressly as a committee of experts rather than a court, analysis of its recent practice 
reveals that it is becoming increasingly "court-like."
19 
The ICCPR is not the only treaty to have addressed civil and political rights, but it is 
certainly the most central.  Many of these rights have also been developed at the regional level, 
and in Europe with accompanying institutions with real enforcement power.  The first 18 Articles 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1953) anticipates the civil and political rights covered by the ICCPR, and Section II establishes a 
regional court to assure enforcement.
20 All of the first generation civil rights covered in the 
ICCPR are also detailed in the American Convention on Human Rights, book-ended by 
guarantees of juridical personhood and judicial protection of the rights contained in the treaty.
21 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) contains in a more limited and 
contingent form some of the civil rights found in the ICCPR, including liberty and security of 
person, a right to a trial, freedom of conscience, free practice of religion, the right to disseminate 
                                                 
16   The “Asian values” debate is pertinent in this regard.  On the idea that the global civil rights regime 
may not be compatible with Southeast Asian notions of statehood see Mohamad 2002. 
17   Forsythe, for example prefers to think of the activities of the Human Rights Committee as 
“socialization” rather than enforcement Forsythe 1985.   
18   For a legal analysis of the individual right of petition before the Human Rights Committee see De 
Zayas, Moller, and Opsahl 1985; Ghandhi 1986; Heffernan 1997; McGoldrick 1991; Myullerson 1992.  For 
an example of a Human Rights Committee communication process that had an impact on government 
practices in the case of New Zealand see De Zayas, Moller, and Opsahl 1985.  
19   Helfer and Slaughter 1997.  For a review of the literature on the effectiveness of the Human Rights 
Committee, see Donnelly 1998; Keith 1999. 
20  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered 
into force Sept. 3, 1953. 
21  American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into 
force July 18, 1978.  See the extensive list in Chapter II (Articles 3-25).   6 
one’s opinion, and free assembly and association.
22 Practically the entire panoply of civil rights 
has been exported from the ICCPR to other international conventions aimed at protecting specific 
groups, including the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
23 and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
24    
 
II.  Theoretical Argument: Compliance with the ICCPR 
 
Why should governments comply with the treaties they ratify?  The current state of the 
literature suggests that, especially in the human rights area, they largely do not.  Human rights 
treaties are not likely to be enforced, according to a dominant view, and for this reason states are 
likely to ratify to enjoy the expressive benefits of doing so without concern that their legal 
commitment will be enforced.   
The cynical view flows from an emphasis on international enforcement, but a neglect of 
domestic politics.  While it may be true that international actors – and especially other states – 
have little incentive to enforce their peer’s human rights commitments in any serious and 
systematic ways, domestic actors have a clear stake in their enforcement.  For the locals, their 
rights and freedoms are at stake.  Thus we should expect that if international law with respect to 
human rights is to be enforced, the most consistent pressure to do so should emanate from 
domestic politics.
25   
There are a number of ways in which international human and civil rights treaties might 
be expected to influence domestic politics.  Most obviously, most treaties are exogenous to the 
domestic legislative activities of most states.  The question of their ratification and 
implementation places an issue on the national agenda that might not have been there in the 
absence of the treaty adoption itself.  Even if they are not especially controversial, the existence 
of a treaty raises the question of ratification, putting an item on the national legislative agenda 
that might not have been there otherwise.  Treaties can therefore have policy effects without 
raising much controversy, largely through elite consensus in favor of ratification.  
                                                 
22   African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986:  See generally articles 6-14. 
23  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. res. 2106 
(XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered 
into force Jan. 4, 1969.  See especially Article 5 (a-d). 
24   Among other things, guaranteeing children a right to religious freedom and free conscience, peaceable 
assembly, and civil rights when accused of crimes (CRC, articles 14, 15 and 40 respectively).  
25  Simmons forthcoming: ch. 3. 7 
The more interesting cases, however, are those in which governments ratify an 
international human rights agreement yet make no move to implement or to comply with it. Why 
should a ratified treaty make any difference in such cases?  One reason is that treaties constitute 
law in many countries, and could strengthen civil rights litigation.  Of course, for this mechanism 
to work, it is necessary that the courts in the country in question are sufficiently independent of 
the political powers that they can render an independent judgment with some probability of 
constraining political actors.  Litigation in national courts is one of the best strategies available 
for creating home-grown pro-rights jurisprudence.
26   Of course, the availability of treaty law 
certainly does not assure litigation will take place.  Potential litigants must be aware – or come to 
be made aware – of their rights under international law (or under the implementing legislation it 
has inspired).  A certain degree of “legal literacy” is required if individuals are to access the 
courts.
27   Litigation is limited for a number of reasons,
28 but cases involving international legal 
guarantees touching on civil rights seem to be on the rise in many places.
29 
Quite aside from litigation (or sometimes using it as part of a broader strategy), 
international legal agreements can be important aspects of domestic political mobilization to 
demand rights adherence from governments.  Suppose that the probability that citizens will 
mobilize to demand a civil right depends on two factors: the value they place on that right and the 
likelihood that mobilization will be effective.  These two factors represent the “expected value” 
                                                 
26 Osofsky 1997.  On transnational public law litigation generally, see Koh 1991. 
27   On this point see the work of Merry 2006. 
28   Frymer 2003. pp. 486-488.   On the potential for human rights litigation in the United States, see Tolley 
1991.  The point being that the potential exists, but it is relatively limited.  Individuals’ access to courts 
varies greatly.  The Supreme Court of India, for example has decided that cases can be taken upon behalf of 
those in poverty who are unable to file for themselves, and that such cases can be initiated simply by letter.  
See Ellmann 1998. p. 358.  
29   Examples of litigation involving rights guaranteed by ratified treaties can be found in every region of 
the globe.   Human rights litigation is burgeoning in some parts of the developing world, notably in Latin 
American countries with fairly recent histories of severe rights abuses.  See  Kim and Sikkink 2007.  
Several African countries have used international treaties to shape their own jurisprudence on civil and 
political rights.  Namibian courts have referred to the ICCPR to provide guidance in the determination of 
national discrimination law. Tshosa 2001: 110. Botswanian courts have made reference to international 
instruments to determine reasonable criteria for a fair trial. Tshosa 2001: 172.  The Russian Court has used 
international law to support its decisions in criminal justice cases as well, instructing the rest of the 
judiciary to apply the ICCPR over domestic legislation in cases involving petitions about the lawfulness of 
detentions. Danilenko and Burnham 2000. p. 43.  In Japan women have used the courts to realize their right 
not to be discriminated against in employment, while in Israel, the Supreme Court has ruled that certain 
interrogation practices do, in fact, constitute torture as understood by the Committee Against Torture.
  
These and other examples of successful litigation based on human rights treaties are collected by a variety 
of NGOs.  See for example http://madre.org/articles/int/hrconv.html] Cases filed in the Indian Supreme 
Court in 1994 “asked the Court to order the government to show what steps were being taken to end 
discrimination in the personal laws consistent with the principles of CEDAW” thus effectively forcing the 
government to articulate the extent of its compliance with its 1993 ratification commitment. Merry 2006: 
167. 8 
of mobilization. The expected value of mobilization varies across countries.  In general, the value 
a citizen is likely to place on a treaty-protected civil right will be higher in non-democratic 
countries where the marginal value of an additional right is likely to be much higher than in a 
democracy, where access to a large number of rights is already secure.  But at the same time, the 
likelihood that mobilization will succeed is higher in a democracy, where more responsive 
government is the norm.  When we combine these two factors, as illustrated in Figure 1a, it 
becomes clear that the expected value of mobilization is rather small in both stable democracies 
and stable autocracies, but significant in countries in the middle – that have some possibility of 
non-autocratic governance yet do not have a broad and secure panoply of civil rights.  In these 
countries, citizens have both the motive and the means to organize to demand respect for civil 
rights from their governments.  
 
[FIGURE 1A ABOUT HERE] 
 
Ratification of the “International Bill of Rights” influences citizens’ mobilization 
calculations in two ways.  On the one hand, in non-democracies, ratification injects a new model 
of rights into the domestic discourse, potentially altering expectations of domestic groups, and 
encouraging them to imagine themselves as entitled to forms of official respect they may never 
have dreamt themselves entitled to.  The model has all the more power, because the government 
has actively assented to the rights in question, imbuing them with a legitimacy they would not 
have in the absence of ratification.  As constructivist theory suggests, there are good reasons to 
attribute an educative function to international legal instruments, especially once they have been 
formally accepted by government authorities.  This educative function of international treaties 
ought to be weak or even absent in democracies, where many if not most of the civil rights in 
question are already part of political life. 
On the other hand, international treaties are much more likely to enhance the probability 
of success in making civil rights demands in a democracy than in a non-democracy.  Democratic 
governments are much more constrained by constitutional and statutory law; they are more likely 
to have independent courts, and to be composed of a citizenry that is quite legally literate.  A 
ratified treaty will therefore have strategic legal value in a democracy that it is likely to lack in an 
autocracy.  Citizens that are armed with “new law” are more likely to be more empowered in a 
system based on the rule of law than one based on more arbitrary and unconstrained political 
authority.   
 9 
[FIGURE 1B ABOUT HERE] 
 
Thinking of these factors in combination leads to the central expectation of this paper:  
Where we are likely to see the most significant treaty effects – at least with respect to civil and 
political rights – is in the less stable, transitioning “middle ground” regimes.  In these countries, 
individuals have both the motive and the means realistically to press their governments to take 
international human rights treaties seriously.  Treaties can still play a legitimating function, 
reassuring a nascent coalition that their demands are legitimate and solidifying their identity as 
individuals with a moral and legal case to make vis-à-vis their government.  Mobilizing is 
meaningful, even exciting; but not nearly as dangerous as in stable autocracies that tolerate no 
opposition.  Treaties create additional political resources for pro-rights coalitions under these 
circumstances; they resonate well with an embryonic rule of law culture, and gather support from 
groups that not only believe in the specific rights at stake, but also believe they must take a stand 
on rule-governed political behavioral in general.  The courts may be somewhat corrupt, 
inexperienced, or even incompetent, but they are not nearly as likely to execute the government’s 
will as loyally as in a stable autocracy.  International human rights treaties may be in their most 
fertile soil under such circumstances.  As we shall see, the consequences of ratification for rights 
compliance in these cases can be profound. 
Is the claim that treaty ratification contributes to compliance via enhanced political 
mobilization plausible? Table 1 addresses this issue. It shows that ratification gives rise to a 
significant increase in local memberships in international non-governmental organizations one to 
four years after ratification.  Ratification appears to stimulate membership in civil society 
organizations, even when we control for external aid, population growth, wealth, and a time 
trend.  It is therefore at least plausible that the treaty effects discussed above have much to do 
with the organization of civil society demands for compliance.  This interpretation is consistent 
with a host of case studies that describe treaties as an important tool in drawing attention to the 
civil rights violations of governments.
30 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In the following sections, I test for the impact of ratification of the ICCPR on three 
clusters of civil rights: freedom of religion, fair trials, and the right to life, as reflected in abolition 
                                                 
30  For a discussion of how NGOs such as HRW and ACLU use the ICCPR to criticize, e.g., the United 
States, see Shapiro 1993. 10 
of the death penalty.  I have chosen these areas because they are a fairly hard test for the impact 
of international legal obligations on practices.  Specifically, I have decided to avoid those aspects 
of the ICCPR that are practically synonymous with democracy itself.
31   In this way, I am trying 
to separate treaty effects on civil rights from the more general waves of democratization that have 
swept most regions of the world over the course of the latter half of the 20
th century.  The rights I 
choose to analyze are civil rights over which even democratic countries could plausibly have 
quite different practices and place quite different priorities.  While rightly considered an 
“enlightenment right” the freedom to practice one’s own religion is not quintessentially an aspect 
of democratization, and as we will see does not vary directly with regime type.   A similar point 
applies to the quality of criminal justice. Since most citizens will never brush up against the 
criminal justice system, this is an area that could easily lag behind the broader processes of 
“democratic development.” And yet how a society deals with persons accused and convicted of 
serious crimes is a central civil rights issue. 
III.  Religious Freedom 
The freedom to believe in and to practice the religion of one’s choice is a right with a 
long historical pedigree.  Confessional differences were one of the earliest areas of social 
difference among groups – a signal distinction that was quite salient until well into the eighteenth 
century.
32  Protection for religious minorities was an important part of the Treaty of Westphalia,
33 
which, however, was by no stretch of the imagination a human rights document.  Still, it is 
probably correct to think of religious rights as among the first, if not the first, set of rights 
accorded first to groups and later to individuals through international legal agreements.
34 
Governments have been concerned about the practice and protection of religion over the 
centuries because it has implications for their political legitimacy and authority.  As John Hall has 
written, “Religions deal in ultimate meanings that bear a claim to exceed merely secular 
authority. Thus, they remain a potent basis for contesting political legitimacy both within and 
beyond nation-states…”
35  Governments have oftentimes feared that their authority could be 
                                                 
31  Article 25 of the ICCPR for example provides a right “To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors;…”  Such a right is so intimately connected – practically by 
definition – with regime type that it makes little sense to test as an empirical outcome of a treaty 
commitment.   
32 Hannum 1991. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Humphrey 1984:  176; Partsch 1981:  209; Sieghart 1983. 
35  Hall 2003. 11 
undermined by spiritual claims that transcend their temporal and territorial domain.  Sociologists 
have discovered that political movements with religious roots typically “…originate in social 
strata that are negatively privileged politically and economically, or socially ascendant but 
blocked from power."
36  Religion can and historically has served to mobilize political opposition 
in ways that dominant social classes or regimes view as threatening. Religious fervor and 
religious intolerance have historically been prime ingredients in episodes and even eras of violent 
conflict.
37  More mundanely, governments might choose to repress even relatively powerless 
religious movements or individuals, in order to “reinforce general norms of cultural 
conformity."
38  Often restrictions on religious organizations and practices involve calculated 
efforts to balance political control with personal freedom. The Communist Party of China’s effort 
carefully to control certain religious practices while accepting others can be viewed as an effort to 
grant limited personal autonomy while trying to guard the political legitimacy of the regime,
39 
which is typically justified in the name of maintaining “social harmony.”
40 
Religion has always been a social force with which governments have had to reckon.  
Recent surges in various indicators of religious fervor have made the issue more pertinent than 
ever.  Throughout the former Soviet Union in the past 30 years with approximately 100 million 
people joined religious groups for the first time.
41  According to Ronald Inglehart, scholar and 
Chairman of the World Values Survey, “…unequivocally... there are more people alive today 
with traditional religious beliefs than ever before in history, and they're [sic.] a larger percentage 
of the world's population than they were 20 years ago.”
42   
Modern states have come up with legal mechanisms for handling issues of religious 
freedom and its limits. Western perspectives typically assume that religious tolerance is the basis 
for peace;
 43 the separation of church and state is an oft advocated formulation.  Today, as many 
as one-third of the nations of the world include formal guarantees of church-state separation in 
their constitutions.
44  Even the constitutions of communist countries guaranteed freedom of 
                                                 
36  Ibid. 
37   Some studies suggest that religious nationalism has had an especially strong association with violent 
conflict since the 1980s.  See  Fox 2004. 
38  Hall 2003. 
39  Potter 2003. 
40  Kolodner 1994: 466. 
41  Froese 2004: 57.  Froese notes that this has lead not to a proliferation of religious faiths but to the 
unprecedented growth in religious monopolies associated with orthodox Christianity and Islam.  
42   Ronald Ingelhart, chairman.  “Is there a Global Resurgence of Religion?”  speech before the National 
Press Club, May 8 2006.  Transcript available at https://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventID=116. 
43  See studies by the United States Institute of Peace, discussed in Little 1996:  75. 
44  Davis 2002: 223.  On Latin American constitutional provisions see Sigmund 1996. 12 
religious belief and practice, as long as religions were not “misused” politically for opposing the 
(socialist) constitution.
45   
 
Religious Freedom and International Law 
International law has had several responses to the issue of religious freedom.  During the 
interwar years, Article 22 on the League of Nations Covenant imposed upon Mandatory Powers 
the duty to guarantee freedom of conscience and religion.
46 The Universal Declaration, though 
not legally binding, stipulates in Article 18 that:  “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”
47 
The ICCPR contains a number of articles that obligate state parties to respect the right of 
individuals to believe and practice their own religion.
48  Article 2 prohibits discrimination of the 
rights enumerated in the Covenant on the basis of, among other things, religion, and Article 24 
extends protection against discrimination explicitly to children.
49 Article 20(2) calls on states 
parties to prohibit “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence…”
50   The most important guarantee of religious freedom 
is spelled out in Article 18, which provides that “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.” 
51  
According to Article 4(2), Article 18 is one of the provisions of the treaty that is non-derogable, 
even in a declared national emergency.
52  Interestingly, the ICCPR’s Article 18 does not reiterate 
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the UDHR’s language specifying a right to change religions – a provision that was opposed by 
Saudi Arabia and other conservative Muslim countries.
53 
Several regional agreements also contain provisions about religious freedom.
54  Article 9 
of the 1950 European Convention almost replicates Art 18 para 3 of the ICCPR.  The 
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act 
refers to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion.
55  The 1960 American Convention on Human Rights provides for 
freedom of conscience and religion (Article 12), and proclaims the right to maintain and to 
change one's religious beliefs.
56  Article 8 of the African Charter guarantees free conscience and 
the free practice of religion.
57   
Islamic agreements referring to religious freedom are much more circumspect.  While 
agreeing to the principle of freely chosen religious commitments, they evince a real concern with 
conversion from Islam to other belief systems.  The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights (1990) 
prohibits "any form of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to 
convert him to another religion or to atheism" (Article 10).
58  Article 22 allows freedom of 
expression as long as it is exercised in a manner that is not contrary to the principles of Shari'a.
59  
Religious freedom is sharply curtailed in certain Islamic theologies, according to some scholars, 
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by the view that conversion from Islam to another religion is tantamount to treason, and 
potentially punishable by death.
60 
More than a decade after the ICCPR opened for signature, the General Assembly passed 
a (non-binding) resolution that filled out some of the details of the religious clauses of the 
ICCPR.  In 1981, the UNGA adopted by consensus the Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.  Its main purpose is to 
give more concrete content to the general norms of the Universal Declaration and the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.
61   UN-based law on religious freedom is also reiterated in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which acknowledges children’s “freedom to manifest 
[their] religion or religious beliefs" (Article 14), although this is the most reserved against 
provision of that convention.
62 
Despite these international legal obligations, it is not at all obvious that governments have 
taken practical measures to improve religious freedom within their jurisdictions.  In 1986, a study 
of UN members’ constitutions found that most had in fact provided for the protection of religious 
freedoms in their national constitutions and guarded against religious discrimination in their penal 
codes – though very few countries were judged to have implemented these measures in a 
satisfactory way in practice.
63  State control over religious groups in Communist China has long 
been notoriously tight and treatment of many religious groups especially harsh.
64  Some countries, 
such as Russia, have ratified the ICCPR but have also recently implemented domestic laws on 
religious freedom that are noticeably more restrictive.
65  In fact, as Peter Beyer has noted, 
“…maintenance of some kind of religious hegemony is the rule all across global society… 
unfettered freedom of religion or genuine religious pluralization is correspondingly rare, if it 
exists anywhere.”
66  Even liberal democracies such as Germany and France have taken actions 
that to some extent discriminate against or suppress religious groups and practices.
67  Richard 
Lillich has concluded that “…one is forced to acknowledge that the right of religious freedom is 
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one of the weakest – from the point of view of its recognition and its enforcement – of all the 
rights contained in articles 3-18 of the Universal Declaration.”
68  Does it matter for the enjoyment 
of religious freedom that governments have committed themselves to the ICCPR? 
 
Data and Methods 
 
While no society can be characterized by the perfectly free practice of religious beliefs – 
even the hyperliberal United States curtails religious practices considered immoral or a public 
danger – it is reasonable to expect that governments who have committed themselves to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to move in the direction of a relatively more 
liberal approach to religious belief and practice.  In order to test this proposition, it is necessary to 
measure the relative liberality of official practices.  Data collected by Cingranelli and Richards 
provides one such measure.  Their religious freedom indicator measures “the extent to which the 
freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious beliefs is subject to actual government 
restrictions. Citizens should be able to freely practice their religion and proselytize (attempt to 
convert) other citizens to their religion as long as such attempts are done in a non-coercive, 
peaceful manner.”
69  This variable is dichotomous; that is, countries are coded as either restrictive 
or free.  Governmental practices that count as restrictions include prohibitions on proselytizing, 
prohibitions on clergy’s political participation; the arrest, detention or violence toward religious 
officials, citizen conversions forced by government officials, citizen arrests, harassment and/or 
intimidation for religious beliefs and practices, and so forth.   
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The worldwide average relationship between this measure and ratification of the ICCPR 
is depicted in Figure 2.   There appears to be no clear relationship between ICCPR ratification, 
which has trended upward over time, and this average measure of religious freedom worldwide.  
Religious freedom worldwide seems to take a dive between 1985 and 1987, and then improves 
slightly in the earliest post-Cold War years, only to drift downward over the course of the 1990s 
and early 2000s.  Obviously more than international legal developments are at play here.  But the 
question is, given the broad range of pressures on governments to accommodate or to repress free 
religious practices, how, if at all,  has ratification of the main binding global instrument – the 
ICCPR – influenced actual practices? 
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In order to address this question, I use a two-stage regression model in which ratification 
in the region, common law legal system, and ratification procedures are used as instruments for 
ratification.
70  Country fixed effects are included as controls but not reported. A lagged dependent 
variable is also included, so that we are in effect modeling improvements in religious freedom 
from year to year.   
A number of control variables are included so as to reduce the risk of drawing 
inappropriate inferences about ICCPR commitment.  An indicator is included to capture the 
extent to which the state has a constitutionally established relationship with an official religious 
organization. I distinguish those states that established an official religion between 1970 and 
2000, from those that disestablished an official religion in the same time period.  My expectation 
would be that establishment would be associated with more governmental interference in free 
religious practices, which disestablishment would be associated with a liberalizing trend.  I also 
distinguish states that were stable with respect to the establishment of state religion between 1970 
and 2000, although I have no clear expectation for trends in their repression.  After all, there is no 
reason to expect religious repression/freedom in a country to change much where relations 
between church and state are fairly stable.
71 
One of the most important conditions for which to control is the extent of societal 
homogeneity with respect to religious culture.  In societies characterized by a high degree of 
homogeneity, state repression will hardly be necessary to achieve a consensus on basic value and 
social issues.  But where many religious groups vie for social or cultural space, politicians may 
decide to use repression to advantage their religious supporters and quash culturally based 
opposition.  The greater the degree of religious fractionalization, the greater we might expect 
religious repression to be. 
I also control for the dominant religion within each country.  Certainly, no particular 
religious orientation has a monopoly on repressive tactics, whether for political or for spiritual 
reasons.  Yet it remains true that certain of the world’s major religions are “universalistic” in 
orientation; in Ole Riis’s words, they “claim to contain the whole spiritual truth, [while] 
particularistic religions have more specific aims and only claim partial access to that truth.”
 72   
Riis goes on to contend that “While the former confront the individual with a fundamental choice 
and demand total commitment from their members, the latter are less demanding and may even 
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be combined in functional mixtures, which, for the universal religions, would be perceived as 
eclecticism, syncretism and heresy.  As a consequence, religious pluralism seems to be less 
problematic when particularistic religions are involved."
73   For these reasons, I include indicators 
for predominantly Protestant, Catholic and Islamic countries.  If Riis’s observation can be 
generalized, we might expect countries dominated by these faiths to be relatively intolerant of, 
and possibly even repressive toward, religious minorities.   
External pressures could also account for some episodes of liberalization toward religious 
belief and practice. Some of the wealthiest countries in the world are the most democratic and 
among the staunchest supports of rights world wide. Some of these governments are likely to use 
their aid strategically to oppose minority repression of all kinds; religious freedom would be only 
one among many of these governments’ goals.  In addition, foreign aid in some countries – the 
United States in particular – may have been influenced by religious Christians intent on punishing 
governments that take a harsh stance against Christian churches and missionaries.
74  Aid given by 
external actors could easily be conditioned – whether implicitly or explicitly – by demands that 
recipients honor the religious rights of their locals (and of foreign missionaries).   The more 
important such aid is as a proportion of GDP, the more we might expect an improvement in 
religious freedom, quite independent of the demands associated with treaty ratification. 
 
 
Findings: ICCPR Ratification and Religious Freedom 
 
  The results of these analyses are displayed in Table 2.  One thing is quite clear: there are 
many factors that impact government policies with respect to religious freedom than the 
ratification of the ICCPR.  Models 1-3 indicate that ratification is positively associated with 
minimal governmental restrictions on religious freedoms, although the result is statistically 
significant on average only five years after ratification.    Models 3-5 run a similar model on 
subsets of countries: transitioning countries, stable democracies (since World War II), and stable 
autocracies.  These tests show that the transitioning group – countries that have at some point 
since World War II have experienced a modicum of democratic governance – account for the 
most convincing share of the effects of ICCPR ratification.  According to Model 4, we can be 
fairly sure that among transitioning countries, ratification of the ICCPR is associated with an 11 
percent increase in the average religious freedom score.  If anything, ICCPR ratification is 
associated with a slight deterioration in freedom in stable democracies (p=.165, below standard 
levels of statistical significance), while in stable autocracies, the standard error is far too high to 
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draw any inferences at all.  Ratification of the ICCPR is most convincingly associated with 
improvements in religious freedoms in countries in transition. These results are robust to the 
inclusion of country and year fixed effects, a year trend, the actual degree of democracy in each 
year, and average religious freedom in the region.
75 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Of course, much else explains governments’ efforts to control religious beliefs and 
practices in their jurisdictions. The changing relationship between church and state over time 
appears to be quite important, but it varies significantly across subgroups by regime type.  
Establishment and disestablishment were associated with greater governmental restrictions on 
religion in general, but not within stable democracies, where these changes seem to make no 
systematic difference to religious freedoms.  Generally, in countries with a high degree of 
religious fractionalization, there tends to be much more official state oppression than in more 
religiously homogenous societies, but the stable autocracies account for most of the repression in 
this case.  For an autocrat, religious opposition might well represent a perceived political threat, 
“justifying” a crack down on the religious followers of political rivals.  
Foreign aid also seems to work, as expected: as aid increases as a proportion of the 
recipient’s GDP, governments tend to remove restrictions and take a more liberal approach to 
religious freedoms. This result is especially strong for autocracies, though weak to non-existent 
within stable democracies.  A strong possibility is that aid is given selectively, that is, to countries 
that already have fairly strong respect for religious freedoms.  It could also indicate a form of soft 
conditionality if aid providers extend assistance on the understanding that rights practices with 
respect to religious freedoms are expected to improve.  Surprisingly, a country’s level of 
development seems to be negatively associated with religious freedoms: controlling for 
differences between countries, and focusing only effects within them, greater wealth per capita is 
associated with more governmental interference with religious freedom.  
Finally a word about religious freedoms across the major religious cultures.  Because 
they span many nations, I have tested for differences in practices with respect to religious 
freedom for predominantly Protestant, Catholic, and Islamic nations.  No predominantly Islamic 
countries were among the stable democracies, but neither branch of Christianity had any 
significant impact on religious freedoms in stable democracies.  Predominant religious culture in 
the transitioning countries and stable autocracies display contrasting results, with Islam associated 
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with greater religious freedoms among transitioning countries and Christianity associated with 
greater religious freedom among stable tyrants.  
For our purposes, the major result is the weak but noticeable influence of ICCPR within 
five years of ratification for all regime types, with a clear concentration of these positive effects 
within countries that have had at least some post war experience with a moderate level of 
democratic governance.  This is consistent with a theory that predicts the strongest treaty effects 
iin countries in which individuals and groups have both the motive and the means to demand 
treaty adherence.  It is also consistent with anecdotal evidence of the weight that at least some 
religious groups attach to ratification of the ICCPR as a way to enhance their ability to operate 
freely in many locations throughout the world.
76  Indeed, the ability to organize and to draw from 
the strength of faith-based communities with dense social networks may be one of the key 
reasons the ICCPR’s religious guarantees are more difficult for governments to ignore than other 
aspects of the treaty.  A fairly sharp comparison can be drawn with civil rights touching on 
criminal justice, which is explored in the following sections. 
 
IV.  Fair Trials 
The right to a fair trial has deep historical roots that extend back as far as the Magna 
Carta (1215).
77  The idea of that document – and many to follow with successively greater 
elaboration and expansion – was to prevent the arbitrary exercise of sovereign power to arrest, 
detain and convict individuals for various infractions and misdeeds without basic provisions for 
the due processes of law.   
So why do some states fail to provide their populace access to a fair trial?  One cluster of 
explanations resides in the generally repressive nature of governance on which some regimes 
rely. Denying access to justice for political opponents to common criminals is one way for an 
oppressive state to maintain its arbitrary control over social and political developments. Demands 
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for fair treatment before the law have historically been associated with a break with arbitrary or 
authoritarian rule.  Fair trials were central among the liberties that distinguished the colonial 
rights of Englishmen in the New World on the eve of the American Revolution.
78 Fair trials were 
also a centerpiece of the democratic transition in former Communist countries, such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Romania, and made their way prominently in to the 
new post-Communist constitutions in these state.
79  A right to a fair trial was not included in the 
South African constitution until apartheid was brought down in 1994; such a right as existed in 
common law in that country could be overridden legislatively according to principles of 
parliamentary sovereignty.
80  The concept of popular sovereignty historically has fueled demands 
for legal reforms that reflect the basic civil right to due process of law for individuals accused of 
crimes.
81   
There may be other reasons for weak due process in practice.  Some observers associate a 
breakdown in the fair delivery of criminal justice with a broad incapacity of organs of justice 
more generally.  In parts of Asia, fair trials are seen as a symptomatic of the widespread demise 
of judicial independence more generally.
82  In particular, some countries are plagued with judicial 
incompetence and poor police training.
83  The provision of a fair trial may be limited not only for 
political purposes of despotic states, but can also flow from bureaucratic incapacities that stem 
from broader resource deficiencies.  
 
Fair Trials in International Law 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the first modern multilateral document 
to articulate a right to a fair trial.  Fair trials were somewhat less controversial than the provision 
of religious freedom, though debates did ensue about the exact parameters of this guarantee.  The 
United States was eager to articulate post-war principles of civil and political rights, and provided 
the first proposal containing some of the substantive fair trial provisions for the UDHR.
84  The 
United Kingdom drafted provisions for protections from arbitrary arrest.
85  Delegations from 
Cuba, Chile, and Mexico were also especially active in the drafting of fair trial provisions, and 
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were insistent on their inclusion.  As a result of these efforts, fair trials feature prominently in the 
UDHR: Article 8 provides for remedies for violations of the right to a fair trial; Article 9 deals 
with arbitrary arrest; Article 10 expresses the basic right of the individual to a fair trial in both 
civil and criminal proceedings; and Article 11 refers to a presumption of innocence and the 
prohibition of ex post facto laws and penalties.
86   
The ICCPR was negotiated concurrently with the Universal Declaration, and the UDHR’s 
articles 8-11 were made legally binding in Articles 14 and 15 of the Covenant. “All persons shall 
be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, 
or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law,” according to 
Article 14.
87  Article 15 guarantees a presumption of innocence and prohibition of ex post facto 
laws, and is one of the seven articles specified as non-derogable in Article 4.
88 The ICCPR also 
addresses some events leading up to and following the trial proper, including arrest, detention, 
interrogation, and punishment.
89  According to the Human Rights Committee, the object and 
purpose of these provisions, and especially Articles 14 and 15, is to ensure that no one is subject 
to arbitrary prosecution, conviction, or punishment.
90 
Fair trials are also mentioned in several regional human rights agreements. The Americas 
were among the earliest to institutionalize a right to a fair trial on a regional basis.  The 1948 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man mentions a fundamental right to access 
the courts “to ensure respect for his legal rights”
91  while the American Convention on Human 
Rights provides for a liberal list of “minimal guarantees” for “[e]very person accused of a 
criminal offense…”
 92 Article 6 of the 1953 European Convention for the Protection of Human 
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courts (e.g., military tribunals) that try civilians, and view fair trial provisions as pertaining to violations 
made at any stage of the proceedings.   Human Rights Committee General Comment 13 (21) (adopted in 
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http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm.  
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended), which preceded, the ICCPR, specifies a right to 
a fair trial, and describes this right in much the same way as does the ICCPR.
93  The League of 
Arab States’ Charter on Human Rights (as revised, 2004) also contains guarantees with respect to 
fair trials.
94  Article 7 of the African Charter includes rights to be presumed innocent, to defense 
and counsel of accused’s choice, the right to an impartial trial within a reasonable period of time 
and protection from ex post laws, but does not contain many of the other components of a fair 
trial specified in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
95   The right to a fair trial is also addressed under 
international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their 1977 
Protocols.
96 
The ICCPR remains the most important universal treaty to guarantee a right to a fair trial.  
What has the ratification of the ICCPR contributed to the actual provision of a fair approach to 
criminal justice?  The strategy for answering this question is discussed in the following section. 
 
Data and Methods 
If the ICCPR has an influence on the civil rights of accused persons, then we should see 
actual practices guaranteeing fairness to improve among ratifiers. Oona Hathaway has developed 
a sophisticated measure of fair trials, using international legal texts – primarily the ICCPR – as 
her guide and State Department reports for the raw material from which her index is coded.
97 The 
index considers the extent to which trials are carried out by independent and impartial tribunals; 
whether an accused person has a right to counsel (and if necessary, an interpreter) and to present a 
defense; whether there is a presumption of innocence; the trial is held publicly, in a timely 
fashion and with a right to appeal.  In addition, she coded for prohibitions on ex post facto laws 
and the right to have charges presented with prior notice.
98  This index captures well the 
international norms embodied in the ICCPR. 
Figure 3 illustrates the world-wide average of the Fair Trials scale each year from 1982 to 
2002.  We only have data since 1982, but the trends are toward a slight deterioration in the mid 
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1980s and again in the late 1990s.  On the face of it, it would appear there is very little 
relationship between average global ratification of the ICCPR and the average on this scale, in 
contrast to the broader civil liberties measure examined above.  Of course, many factors influence 
the will and capacity to provide individuals accused of a crime with a fair trial.  What if anything 
does ratification contribute?   
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In order to answer this question, it is again important to construct a model that accounts 
for ratification endogeneity, constant characteristics of countries, shocks specific to particular 
years, and a host of alternative explanations.  The models reported in Table 3 pool countries over 
time and employ two-stage least squares, and endogenize the decision to ratify the ICCPR as 
described above.
99  They all contain country fixed effects, so that constant characteristics of 
particular countries do not drive results; as well as year fixed effects, to control for the possibility 
that some common external shock jolts all countries to alter their policies at given points in time.  
To account for policy inertia, the dependent variable lagged three years is included, as are 
average regional trial practices to account for the possibility of socialization or mimicry toward 
regional norms.  Since we do not want to confuse the effects of ICCPR ratification with the 
general processes associated with democratization, variables to capture both democratic levels 
and change are included.  Since it is reasonable to assume that fair criminal justice is more likely 
to be suspended during national emergencies, civil and international wars are included.  Fair trials 
could also be a function of development level (GDP/capita) or external influences, such as 
development assistance; both of these are controlled in what follows.  In addition, I control for 
extraordinary efforts to improve government accountability with respect to human rights practices 
with controls for truth commissions and criminal trials aimed at prosecuting officials for criminal 
human rights violations. As above, robust standard errors with a correction for clustering on 
country are reported. 
Oona Hathaway pioneered research in this area, and found that ratification of the ICCPR 
had little effect on state practices with respect to fair trials.  Quite the contrary: some analyses of 
her evidence suggest that rights practices worsen once a treaty commitment has been made. 
However, I am interested not only in the aggregate effects of the ICCPR with respect to fair trials, 
                                                 
99  Unfortunately, in this case, the common law variable is unlikely to make a good instrument.  According 
to some legal scholars, the idea of a fair trial for those accused of crimes is a contribution of the common 
law tradition, with its emphasis on “fair play.”  See for example Matscher 2000:  10.  Thus, identification in 
this case depends almost exclusively on regional ratification density in the previous period.  24 
but also in the conditions under which we might expect ratification to have its strongest impact.  
Theoretically, there are strong reasons to suspect that fair trials are already provided in stable 
democracies, and there is little reason for ratification of the ICCPR to stimulate new political 
demands in that regard.  Nor should we expect the ICCPR to make much difference in stable 
autocracies, where potential demandeurs can anticipate costly state resistance.  Ratification 
should matter most where local groups have both the motive and the means to demand 
compliance.  This is the case in countries characterized by some degree of regime transition.  
 
  Findings: ICCPR Ratification and Fair Trials 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results for the influence of ICCPR treaty commitments are reported in Table 3.  With 
one exception, in every version of the model, ICCPR ratification is associated with improvements 
in fair trial practices.  However, when all countries are included in the sample, the result does not 
meet traditional standards of statistical significance.  Interesting variation emerges, however, 
when we look at subgroups of countries.  Ratification of the ICCPR appears to have no 
discernable effects in countries that were never democratic during the post World War II period, 
nor in stable democracies over those years.   But if we run a similar test for countries that had had 
some experience with democratic politics – transitional countries in the sense that they had passed 
a moderately high democratic threshold at some point in the post war years – ratification of the 
ICCPR is quite likely to be associated with fairer domestic trials from year to year, at least in the 
short run.  When we look for impact five years out from ratification, the ICCPR effect becomes 
swamped by other factors.    Nevertheless, there is some evidence that for the fifty-five counties 
coded as transitional, ratification has contributed to better practices – fairer trials for individuals 
than would have been the case had the treaty not been ratified at all. 
Ratification of the ICCPR is of course not the only influence on fair trials, and the control 
variables tested here reveal some important influences on legal practices. The usually strongly 
positive lagged dependent variable indicates that countries with poor ratings were likely to have 
poor ratings in the next period, indicating that the fairness of trials is marked by a high degree of 
institutional inertia. The most consistent external influence across all categories of countries is the 
nature of the practices in the region in which the country is situated.  Across all subgroups and the 
sample as a whole, fair trial practices in the region were a strong predictor of fair trial practices in 
a specific country.  This effect appears to be the strongest among transitional countries, though it 25 
is statistically significant in every model.  This pattern could be explained by shared cultural 
patterns or even regional socialization or mimicry. Another external influence that is strongest in 
transitional countries is the positive influence of overseas development assistance.   But it is 
important to note that the effects of the ICCPR are noticeable among the transitional countries 
even when controlling for their regional context and foreign development aid.   
One of the most important influences on fair trial practices is the nature of the domestic 
political regime, but the results hold some surprises in this regard.  A country’s extent of 
democracy at the time of observation does not have the positive effect on fair trials one might 
expect (except among those countries that have been stable democracies since World War II).  
Even more surprising, democratic change tends to lead to worse fair trial practices in the 
following year, and this result is especially robust for the 55 transitional countries.  What these 
results suggest is that in practice fair trials do not improve in lock-step with democracy and 
democratic improvements.  Protecting the legal rights of the accused requires something more 
than encouraging participatory democracy.  More in line with expectations, civilian governments 
are more likely to be associated with fair trials.  Legal fairness appears to deteriorate 
significantly, especially for countries in transition governed by military leaders. (Note that there 
were no military governments among the stable democracies, so the variable drops out of that 
model.)  There is also some evidence that governments especially committed to exposing the 
crimes and abuses of earlier regimes through the use of truth commissions also improve their 
trials in the following year. Unsurprisingly, countries that score high on the rule of law scale also 
tend to provide fairer trials for accused persons.  The inclusion of these variables helps to control 
for a domestically generated commitment to improve human rights practices, and increases our 
confidence that the ICCPR ratification variable is not simply reflecting a set of domestic legal 
innovations.  
There is little evidence that fair trial practices are driven by what might broadly be 
considered developmental or local social factors.  While it undoubtedly takes resources to hold 
fair trials – providing the defense with qualified attorneys and educating independent judges is 
not a low cost option – it is not the case that wealthier countries conduct fairer trials, all else 
equal.  In fact, there is some suggestion that the opposite is true, at least for the more authoritarian 
regimes.  Countries that are more varied in terms of religion, language, and ethnic groups may 
tend to have somewhat better practices as well, but this result seems to be driven by the stable 
democracies, such as Belgium, among them.  A burgeoning population may contribute to 
deteriorating practices if social and other problems worsen, though in this case the effects seem to 26 
be concentrated in the stable autocracies. Overall, however, it is hard to say there is a clear social 
or developmental country profile associated with fair trials.   
Far clearer is the role that violent conflict plays in the administration of justice for the 
accused.  The expectation that violent periods of “national emergency” are often used as reasons 
to short-circuit normal rights protections in the name of national security is born out in these tests.  
Both civil wars and interstate wars returned the expected negative coefficient for the sample of 
countries as a whole, but the most consistent deterioration in rights is associated with war is 
concentrated in the countries that were never democratic during the post war years.  The effect is 
apparently contradictory for stable democracies, with civil wars associated with worse practices 
and international wars with fairer trials.  In the transition countries, wars – whether civil or 
international – are not associated with clear trends in fair trials in either direction.   
Overall, the influence of ICCPR ratification on fair trials is highly conditioned by the 
nature of the regime.  There is a mild positive but statistically insignificant association across all 
countries, but the analysis of subgroups indicates that the positive effects are concentrated largely 
in neither the stable democracies nor the stable autocracies, but rather in those polities that have 
had some experience with democratic government, however fleeting.  The statistical strength of 
the relationship is not very strong – we can only be 91-92% confident that the relationship is not 
due to chance alone – but it does offer some evidence that ratification is associated under the right 
political circumstances with actual improvements in fair trials, as required by the ICCPR.  
 
V.  Cruel and Inhumane Punishment: The Death Penalty 
 
A final area to consider governed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and especially its optional protocol, is that of cruel and inhuman punishment. Specifically, 
this section will inquire into compliance with international legal commitments to abolish capital 
punishment, or the penalty of death for the commission of a crime.   
The death penalty is one of the oldest forms of criminal punishment.  Laws providing for 
the death penalty date from the 18
th century BCE in Babylonia. In 7
th century BCE Athens, the 
Draconian code made death the only punishment for all crimes.  In a less absolute form, capital 
punishment became part of Roman law in the 5
th century BCE, and has been used throughout 
much of the world for most of recorded history.
100  The death penalty is referred to in sacred texts 
from the Bible to the Koran. Some anthropologists count capital punishment as a “universal 
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cultural trait” alongside families and religion, viewing it as common at some point in time to all 
known cultures.
 101   
Enlightenment thought ushered in a trend toward greater circumspection regarding the 
death penalty.  The most influential work of the period was penned by the Italian criminologist, 
Cesare Beccaria, who emphasized both its futility and inhumanness.
102  By the 19
th century, 
governments began to view the practice much more critically. There were practical reasons to 
curtail the widespread practice of execution as well.  Many a poor British citizen was hung in 
London in the 18
th century, though the main reason Britain had to curtail public hangings is 
alleged to be not a humanitarian concern, but the problem of numbers.
103  Soon, developments in 
long distance transportation made it possible to export rather than execute offenders – an option 
embraced by abolitionists in England.
104  Opposition to the death penalty began to develop 
elsewhere in the western hemisphere as well.  Michigan became the first jurisdiction to abolish 
the practice permanently, in 1864.
105 Venezuela was one of the first countries to remove the death 
penalty for all crimes (1863), and several countries in Latin America and Europe followed by 
eliminating the death penalty at least during peace time – Portugal being the first in Europe to do 
so in 1864.
106   
The movement to abolish the death penalty gained momentum after World War II.  What 
distinguishes this period of abolition from the past (when it was considered an internal matter) is 
the largely European-driven effort to use international treaties to bring about abolition.
107  As 
discussed in further detail below, since 1983, the Council of Europe has banned the death penalty, 
and accession to that ban is a condition for joining the European Union.
108  In Europe, the 
discourse of "civilization" and human dignity has framed the death penalty debate.
109  Largely as 
a result of this frame, Europe was a “de facto death-penalty-free continent” by the year 2000.”
 110  
Among democracies, the United States stands out as the most important country to oppose the 
European effort to eliminate the death penalty worldwide.
111    
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 Outside of Europe, the death penalty remains widespread, in law and in practice. It 
continues to be used in countries as culturally diverse as China, Islamic countries, and the United 
States.
112  By some accounts the abolitionist movement reached a plateau by the late 1990s.
113  In 
some cases, there have even been reversals (in Gambia, Kansas and New York, for example).  As 
Roger Hood has written, there is nothing inevitable about the process of abolition.
114 
A range of theories have been advanced to explain the retention of the death penalty.  
Some scholars emphasize its role in consolidating political legitimacy,
115 while others link it with 
religious beliefs about the inappropriateness – or the moral necessity – of earthy retribution.
116 
One thing does seem apparent: while numerous studies have shown that repressive governments 
are more likely than liberal ones to have and use capital punishment,
117 there is no necessary link 
between democracy and the decision to abolish the death penalty.  Stable democracies (from the 
United States
118 to Jamaica to Japan
119) as well as some of the most oppressive autocracies (from 
China to Iran to Tajikistan) retain the death penalty for ordinary crimes.
120  And it is quite clear 
that the demand for abolition is not typically linked to popular democratic forces.  In 1975, some 
85% of Britons polled said they favored the death penalty in their country; even though it had 
been repealed a decade earlier.
121 In much of Eastern Europe, the death penalty was repealed, 
despite the fact that public opinion often supported it;
122 in many cases change was wrought 
through constitutional courts rather than parliamentary decision.
123   
This ironic situation – abolition often against prevailing public preferences – is one of the 
most intriguing aspects of this issue area.  Democratic governments are often willing to abolish 
capital punishment, despite fairly broad public support for it in many cases.  Despite the moral 
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argument that can be made against the death penalty,
 124 broad swathes of democratic publics are 
likely to accept the utilitarian notion that the death penalty deters crime
125 and to believe that it 
appropriately respects the interests of victims and/or their families for “closure.”
 126 “Tough on 
crime” rhetoric can be used to deflect incipient concerns regarding the morality of capital 
punishment, and mobilize popular consent for the death penalty.
127 
 
The Death Penalty in International Law 
The death penalty has only been addressed in international law since World War II.  It 
was discussed by the Human Rights Commission while debating the contents of the Universal 
Declaration, but no clear consensus could be reached.  Article 3 provides that “Everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of person” while Article 5 requires that “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
128  No 
specific mention is made of the death penalty.  Negotiation of the ICCPR provided another 
opportunity to be explicit about banning the death penalty in international law.  This time the 
opportunity was taken, but a clear compromise was struck. The Covenant reiterated an 
affirmative right to life.
129  It also provided that for countries that had not already abolished the 
death penalty, that it should be used only for the most serious crimes, but that this provision 
should not be used to justify delay of abolition.
130 An explicit ban was opposed by the United 
States as well as the majority of predominantly Muslim countries.
131  While there may have been 
some assumption of an eventual ban by many countries, continuing disagreement led to 
compromise language.  
In contrast to fair trial guarantees, which are rarely opposed in principle by any 
government, state opponents of the death penalty are often explicit in their opposition.  The 
strongest opponents to the abolition of the death penalty in UN debates have been Singapore and 
Egypt, who have led the charge against several EU efforts to universalize and strengthen 
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international law on the death penalty.
132  Several governments have made clear reservations or 
declarations to the ICCPR, indicating their clear understanding that it does not prohibit the use of 
capital punishment.  Both the United States’ and China’s reservations to the ICCPR, for example, 
explicitly exempt them from provisions regarding the death penalty.
133  In debates before the 
United Nations, Sudan has claimed that "Capital punishment is a divine right of some religions.  
It is embodied in Islam and these views must be respected."
134  While some scholars have claimed 
that the ban against the death penalty has hardened into a custom in international law,
135  it seems 
unlikely that this view would be broadly accepted outside of Europe and possibly Latin America. 
The countries of Europe were determined to proceed with law development against the 
death penalty, despite opposition from the United States and the Middle and Far East. Crucial in 
Europe was the reframing of the death penalty as a human rights issue rather than as an issue of 
criminal justice.  After 30 years of domestic legal change effectively banning capital punishment 
at the national level, the most important regional legal change came with passage of the 1983 
Protocol No. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
136  Like the multilateral optional 
protocol that was to follow, this regional accord banned the death penalty unequivocally, though 
allowing for reservations preserving the option for the most serious crimes during wartime.
137  A 
year later, the UN Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution that acknowledged the 
gravity of the issue without broaching the question of a ban by adopting a resolution to protect the 
rights of persons facing the death penalty.
138 
The general prohibition in international law on executions came in the form of an 
optional protocol to the ICCPR.
139  Adopted by the General Assembly in 1989, this instrument 
bans executions outright.
140  Like European Protocol No. 6, this agreement abolishes the death 
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penalty in all situations including war, unless country specifies through reservation at the time of 
ratification.
141  The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR is the clearest obligatory multilateral 
document to ban the death penalty under virtually all circumstances.  The next section considers 
the extent to which countries have actually complied with their legal obligations in this area, by 
looking at actual patterns of death penalty abolition. 
 
Data and Methods 
If the ICCPR and most especially the Optional Protocol on the Death Penalty have had 
any influence on states practices, we should expect the propensity to remove the death penalty to 
correspond with ICCPR and OP ratification. Of all of the civil rights we have examined in this 
paper, we should expect the results to be the strongest: abolition is a public policy and execution 
is generally a public act taken by the central government in large part for its deterrence value. It is 
relatively easy to monitor cases of capital execution – at least in comparison with torture and the 
fairness of a criminal trial.
142  We should expect compliance to be clearly associated with 
commitment to the ICCPR and its optional protocol once we have accounted for the factors that 
lead countries to ratify these agreements in the first place, as well as a host of alternative 
explanations (discussed below) for reliance on the death penalty itself.   
The dependent variable in the first instance is whether or not the central government has 
the death penalty; the second is whether or not a state removes the death penalty within their 
jurisdiction. The latter is indicated by the first year capital punishment is banned.  In both cases, I 
use a pooled time series for this test and two-stage least squares for whether or not the death 
penalty is in place, and for death penalty removal
143 (endogenizing ICCPR and Optional Protocol 
ratification in both cases).  I expect ratification to reduce the incidence of the death penalty (a 
negative coefficient) and increase the likelihood that the death penalty will be abolished (a 
positive coefficient).  
Before proceeding, it is useful to note that the use of the death penalty is on the decline 
on average world wide.  Figure 4 charts the upward trend of countries that have abolished the 
death penalty completely, the decrease in countries that have abolished it for ordinary crimes, and 
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the nearly constant number of countries that retain the death penalty for extraordinary crimes 
(such as treason during wartime).  The figure also shows the upward trend in the number of 
countries that have ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR since 1989. 
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The empirical problem is to estimate the influence that ratification has had on actual 
practices.  In addition to endogenizing the treaty commitment itself, a battery of controls are 
included to reduce the chance that alternative explanations wash out the effect of making an 
international legal commitment.  Because many theories of the death penalty view it as a 
mechanism of social control, and because ethnic diversity is sometimes construed as a threat to 
such control, one might expect the death penalty to be much more widespread in societies with a 
high degree of ethnic fractionalization.
144   
Domestic political conditions are also likely to be a major explanation.  Although 
democracy per se is not an obvious correlate (as discussed above), I control for regime type and 
changes in regime type on the hypothesis that the trend to abolish the death penalty is a reflection 
of the waves of liberal reform sweeping much of the world generally.  Previous research has 
noted that military governments are more likely to retain the death penalty, as are conservative or 
right wing governments,
145 and so I control for military control of the government as well as 
government partisanship.  At least in the United States, federalism is largely responsible for the 
retention of the death penalty; these tests control for the degree of decentralization of government 
in each case.   
The security environment is also a likely contributor to the decision to impose or lift the 
death penalty.  The option to make reservations allowing for the death penalty in wartime signals 
the importance states have given to issues of national security.  I hypothesize that the death 
penalty is more likely to be retained in states facing civil or international wars.
 146  Some analysts 
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have noted that capital punishment is an instrument of state consolidation.
147 To account for this 
possibility, I include the logged years since each state’s independence.  The longer it has been 
since independence, the less the imperative to maintain capital punishment for purposes of 
consolidating state authority.  
Finally, it is obvious the international environment has been important in fueling the 
abolition movement.
148  The most important factor in this area has been the role that Europe has 
played in trying to persuade governments around the world that capital punishment violates basic 
human rights and ought to be banned. The Council of Europe has made elimination of the death 
penalty a requirement for joining the Council and a criterion of “democracy.”
149  The EU 
campaigns for universal abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances; in fact since 1998 
abolition of the death penalty has been a formal condition of membership, and has clearly 
influenced the policies of some new member states, such as Estonia.
150  By comparison, the Inter-
American regime – the only other region to have an explicit position toward the death penalty – 
freezes current practices, but does not abolish capital punishment.
151  I therefore include 
indicators that should reflect a country’s anticipation of joining the Council of Europe 
(membership three years in the future), the density of regional death penalty states, and a dummy 
variable for Europe itself (East and West). If patterns of abolition are primarily due to European 
socialization (or pressure), these indicators should be associated with a reduction in the death 
penalty and increase in the probability of banning the practice.   
 
Findings: The ICCPR, the Optional Protocol, and Abolition of the Death Penalty 
The results are displayed in Tables 4 and 5.  The primary result is strong support for the 
proposition that countries that ratify the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol are clearly associated 
with abolition of the death penalty in their jurisdiction.  In Table 4, it is clear that ratification of 
the Optional Protocol reduces the likelihood that a state will have the death penalty by anywhere 
from 7 to 11 percent.  This is an effect that is estimated to be directly attributable to the Optional 
Protocol, net of the factors that led the government to ratify it in the first place, net of ICCPR 
ratification, and net of all of the control variables included in the various specifications.  
Moreover, ratification of the Optional Protocol is associated with anywhere from a 30 to 50 
percent greater chance that a country will abolish the death penalty.  Given that many countries 
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abolish in anticipation of ratification, this is a significant impact.  This is one area of human 
rights commitment in which governments commit and follow up with a very high probability. 
Several other factors have a strong relationship with death penalty practices as well.  
Across all specifications, there is strong evidence that ethnic fractionalization is associated with 
maintenance of the death penalty.  The presence of many ethnic groups makes is likely that a state 
will have the death penalty, and much less likely that it will be removed.  The domestic political 
variables that one might have thought would be associated with the death penalty hardly 
contribute to the explanation at all, and when they do, they are not in the direction one would 
expect (military governments are slightly less likely according to table 4 to preside over the death 
penalty).  As one would expect, the death penalty is much more likely to exist and much less 
likely to be removed in countries that have had recent civil war experience, although not 
necessarily embroiled in civil conflict at the moment.   
As noted above, the ICCPR itself does not ban the death penalty.  Ratification of the 
ICPR alone is associated with a much weaker effect on death penalty practices than is the 
Optional Protocol.  In only one model – the one with domestic political controls – was there a 
convincing statistical relationship between ICCPR ratification alone and existence of the death 
penalty.  Only in one model of death penalty repeal did ICCPR ratification have a statistically 
stronger relationship with repeal than did the Optional Protocol.  In each of these cases, the 
substantive significance of the Optional Protocol far outweighs the substantive impact of ICCPR 
ratification.  The substantive effect of the OP on repeal of the death penalty was between 4 to 7 
times larger than for the main treaty.  This evidence is consistent with a theory of international 
law that associates commitment with a serious effort to comply.  In the case of capital 
punishment, characterized by centralized policies that are reasonably easy to monitor, states do 
not ratify until they are certain they will be willing and able to comply.  Ratification matters in 
these cases, precisely because it is straightforward to monitor, observe and criticize potential 
violations. 
   
VI.  Conclusions 
 
The development of international human rights law has been one of the most significant 
projects of the last sixty years.  Statesmen, activists, legal scholars, and organizations have 
committed a great deal of effort to fashioning a legal regime by which individuals might claim a 
broad array of civil rights vis-à-vis their own governments.  Many have boldly labeled the central 
documents reflecting these efforts as “The International Bill of Rights” and have touted it as the 35 
closest thing the international community has to a global constitutional statement of the rights of 
the civil rights of human kind.  There is little doubt that the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR 
represent normative aspirations of a good number of well-intentioned individuals, but it is also 
necessary to take stock of the effects of these documents, and ask, what have they contributed to 
the actual realization of the rights they proclaim?   
This paper has been a modest step toward exploring and trying to answer this question.  It 
has gone beyond claims that treaty ratification is largely symbolic, and taken seriously the idea 
that domestic rights demandeurs have strong incentives to use whatever tools are available to 
them – including international treaty commitments – to claims the rights these treaties express.  
One surprise has been that ratification has mattered at all to civil rights practices, given the 
prevailing assumption that such commitments are close to meaningless and largely unenforced by 
external actors.  It is also surprising given the stringency of the models developed here.  It is not 
easy to claim, given these analyses, that in broadening religious freedom, making trials fairer and 
abolishing the death penalty that governments are simply mimicking others, that this is just a 
residual consequence of the process of democratization, or that the government would have 
changed its behavior even in the absence of the treaty commitment.  These claims do not ring 
true, because they are largely controlled for by the nature of the tests performed.  The methods I 
use do not prove a causal relationship between treaty ratification and improved practices, but they 
do eliminate many alternative explanations that one might have initial thought would be a more 
powerful explanation of official civil rights choices.  Nor do I claim that they treaty commitment 
is the only or even the most important reason for the improvements we do observe.  The claim is 
rather that such commitments have made an important contribution to rights practices, and that 
scholars and practitioners have not to date been able or willing to recognize this contribution.    
Why should treaty ratification matter?  The mechanisms are potentially myriad, but one is 
especially plausible: treaty ratification matters because it stimulates domestic organization and 
mobilizes locals to claim the rights the treaty contains.  We have seen that ICCPR ratification is 
followed by a burst of civil society organization, consistent with the idea that citizens view the 
post ratification period as a time to organize to demand the kinds of rights the treaty promises on 
paper.  Of course, not all kinds of issues elicit identical kinds or degrees of domestic 
mobilization.  This research shows that there is a real payoff to breaking out different kinds of 
“civil rights” and comparing the treaty impact across issue areas.  This is important because the 
politics differ across these issue areas in ways relevant to the mechanisms of treaty compliance. 
Compare religious freedom with fair trials, for example. The domestic demands for compliance 
are likely to be much stronger for religious freedom than for fair trials.  In many cases, religious 36 
freedom will be demanded by organized religious groups, who have the organizational capacity to 
press the government to allow them to worship and practice their religion freely.  The primary 
demanduers of fair trials may not only be political opponents of the government, but also an 
unsavory array of criminals.  Not only is it difficult for such groups to organize themselves, it is 
also often difficult to assemble a broad coalition for fair trials because this can be framed as being 
soft on crime. Unsurprisingly, ratification has a less convincing impact on fair trials.  This does 
not mean, however, that a treaty commitment is meaningless where mobilization is weak.  It may 
mean that other means must be found to enforce compliance.  In Egypt, for example, the high 
court has used the ICCPR to craft rulings that improve the fairness of trials.
152   
One of the most striking results is the evidence of stronger treaty effects in countries 
experiencing regime instability or transition. This was found to be the case with respect both to 
religious freedom and fair trials.  The theoretical discussion provided a good reason to suspect 
that treaty ratification would have the least impact in stable democracies (where rights are already 
very well protected) and in stable autocracies (where people anticipate harsh repression were they 
ever to demand treaty compliance).  The evidence analyzed here is quite consistent with these 
expectations.  With respect to religious freedom, the ICCPR has apparently had practically no 
impact in stable democracies or autocracies, but has had a positive impact in countries with some 
prospect of or experience with moderately responsive government.  The evidence was weaker 
with respect to fair trials, but the basic pattern was similar: much more convincing positive 
ratification effects in the transition countries than in the stable extremes.   
Death penalty compliance contrasts with both fair trials and religious freedom.  For 
starters, governments have often been out ahead of their publics on the issue of death penalty 
abolition.  As I have discussed above, in countries from the United Kingdom to Estonia to 
Poland, European elites have tended to lead their mass publics toward abolition.  Capital 
punishment also contrasts with other forms of government repression in that it is centrally carried 
out in a publicly authorized fashion.  As a result it is easy to monitor – much easier than most 
other government rights practices, including not only fair trials, but also torture, the use of child 
soldiers, or a range of other rights violations that are carried out in a more decentralized fashion 
and are extremely difficult to observe  The ability of other governments, domestic governmental 
officials, groups and citizens to monitor capital punishment all make this an especially crucial 
area for government to ratify a binding obligation only if they are committed to compliance.  The 
strong positive association between ratification and abolition of the death penalty support this 
interpretation.  
                                                 
152  See for example Sharif 2000. 37 
These results suggest a modest but important conclusion: international treaty 
commitments quite likely have made a positive contribution to civil rights practices in many 
countries around the world.  Of course, ratification of the ICCPR does not guarantee good 
practices.  It certainly cannot overcome the stresses of a conflict ridden polity governed by a 
succession of despots.  It may not even be as important as the examples (good and bad) provided 
by other governments in the region.  But ratification does seem to support civil rights 
improvements on the margins.  It does this most consistently where people have both the motive 
and the means to mobilize to demand compliance and where the practice in question can be 
monitored at reasonable cost.  This finding contrast with those of previous scholars, who have 
viewed treaty commitments as cheap opportunities to score public relations points with few risks 
that they will be expected to improve the behaviors the treaty regulates.
153  The evidence 
reviewed here indicates the case for mere symbolic ratification is far from open and shut.  Rather, 
it is consistent with a theory that views ratification as a political opportunity – depending on the 
anticipated costs – to mobilize to demand civil rights guarantees from ones own government.   
                                                 
153 Hathaway 2002; Keith 1999. 38 
 
Figures 1A and 1B: 
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Table 1: 
Effect of ICCPR ratification on local memberships in international non-governmental 
organizations 
Dependent Variable: logged INGO memberships 
OLS regression model 
 Model  1: 
(no fixed effects) 
Model 2: 
Country Fixed Effects 
Logged INGO memberships, t-1  .776*** 
(p=.000) 
-- 
ICCPR ratification, t-1  .054*** 
(p=.000) 
-.044 
(p=.155) 
ICCPR ratification, t-2  --  .011 
(p=.592) 
ICCPR ratification, t-3  --  .033** 
(p=.030) 
ICCPR ratification, t-4  --  .034*** 
(p=.010) 
ICCPR ratification, t-5  --  -.027 
(p=.175) 
Overseas development 
assistance/GDP, t-1 
-.027 
(p=.488) 
.488*** 
(p=.001) 
Logged total population, t-1  .075*** 
(p=.000) 
.528** 
(p=.022) 
Logged GDP/capita, t-1  .072*** 
(p=.000) 
.135 
(p=.180) 
Change in civil liberties, t-1  --  .007 
(p=.408) 
Civil liberties, t-1  .023*** 
(p=.000) 
 
Year trend  .005*** 
(p=.000) 
.042*** 
(p=.000) 
Constant -10.07*** 
(p=.000) 
 
Number of countries  173  173 
Number of Observations  3646  3757 
R-squared .975  .218 
*=significant at .10 level  **=significant at .05 level ***=significant at .01 level 
Note: country fixed effects included in Model 2 but not reported here.  Because of the fixed effect, 
the lagged dependent variable (which functions as a “baseline” for change) is omitted. 
Robust standard errors, clustering on country. 
While inclusion of a time trend does not disturb these results, year fixed effects increase the 
standard errors on ICCPR ratification. 
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Figure 2: 
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Table 2: 
The ICCPR and Freedom of Religion (Dependent Variable: Religious Freedom) 
Two-staged instrumental regression (endogenous: ICCPR ratification) 
 Model  1: 
 
Model 2: 
 
Model 3: 
transition 
countries 
only  
Model 4: 
stable 
democracies 
only: 
Model 5: 
stable 
autocracies 
only: 
ICCPR obligation 
(lagged 5 years) 
.080* 
(p=.055) 
.073* 
(p=.089) 
.111** 
(p=.018) 
-.023 
(p=.165) 
.081 
(p=.402) 
State religion, 1970-
2000 
.600*** 
(p=.052) 
.749*** 
(p=.000) 
-- --  -.614 
(p=.179) 
Establishing states, 
1970-2000 
-.033* 
(p=.092) 
-.305*** 
(p=.009) 
-.709*** 
(p=.000) 
-.091 
(p=.329) 
.787** 
(p=.012) 
Disestablishing states, 
1970-2000 
-.518*** 
(p=.001) 
-.416** 
(p=.016) 
.056*** 
(p=.000) 
.321 
(p=.304) 
.930* 
(p=.074) 
Religious freedom, t-1  .466*** 
(p=.000) 
.464*** 
(p=.000) 
.471*** 
(p=.000) 
.426*** 
(p=.000) 
.456*** 
(p=.000) 
Religious 
fractionalization 
-.0002*** 
(p=.000) 
-.0002*** 
(p=.000) 
.597*** 
(p=.010) 
-- -.00006*** 
(p=.000) 
Overseas development 
aid, t-1 
.476*** 
(p=.004) 
.480*** 
(p=.006) 
.311* 
(p=.091) 
.669 
(p=.351) 
.541** 
(p=.018) 
Logged GDP/capita  -.097* 
(p=.052) 
-.093* 
(p=.090) 
-.126* 
(p=.106) 
-.027 
(p=.666) 
-.155* 
(p=.092) 
Islam -.032*** 
(p=.015) 
-.18 
(p=.306) 
.149 
(p=.122) 
-- -.055** 
(p=.030) 
Catholic .454*** 
(p=.000) 
.463*** 
(p=.000) 
-.382* 
(p=.985) 
-.073 
(p=.405) 
.856*** 
(p=.008) 
Protestant .108*** 
(p=.000) 
.241* 
(p=.055) 
-.061 
(p=.274) 
.165 
(p=.483) 
1.27** 
(p=.013) 
Democracy --  .002 
(p=.336) 
 --  -- 
GDP growth  --  .0004 
(p=.760) 
-- --  -- 
Trade openness  --  -.0005 
(p=.336) 
-- --  -- 
Civil war  --  .023 
(p=.527) 
-- --  -- 
Interstate war  --  .019 
(p=.620) 
-- --  -- 
Country  fixed  effects?  yes yes yes yes yes 
Year  fixed  effects?  yes yes yes yes yes 
# of countries      55  32  59 
# of observations  2691  2556  1022  661  1038 
R-squared  .700 .702 .701 .343 .644 
Instruments:  All explanatory variables, plus ratification procedures, common law tradition, regional 
ICCPR density, a counting vector of years without ICCPR ratification, three cubic splines, and a year trend.42 
 
Figure 3: 
ICCPR Obligations and Fair Trials
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Source:  Fair trials score:  Hathaway 2002 (undated, interpolated, and inverted so 
that high values represent better practices). 43 
Table 3 
Effects of an ICCPR Commitment on Fair Trials 
Dependent Variable: Fair Trial Practices 
Two-staged instrumental regression (endogenous: ICCPR ratification) 
 
Explanatory 
Variables: 
All 
countries 
Trans. 
only 
Trans. 
Only, with 
controls 
Never 
democratic 
only 
Stable 
democraci
es only 
Trans., 
ICCPR 5 
year lag 
ICCPR 
commitment 
.168 
(p=.175) 
.314* 
(p=.086) 
.348* 
(p=.087) 
.094 
(p=.674) 
-.076 
(p=.509) 
.055 
(p=.763) 
Fair trials (t-3)  0.163*** 
(p=.002) 
.152** 
(p=.024) 
.148** 
(p=.047) 
.110 
(p=.125) 
.206 
(p=.220) 
.174** 
(p=.027) 
Regional fair 
trial average (t-
2) 
.163*** 
(p=.001) 
.909*** 
(p=.000) 
1.00*** 
(p=.000) 
.647* 
(p=.054) 
.362*** 
(p=.001) 
1.01*** 
(p=.000) 
Democracy 
(level) 
-.004) 
(p=.635) 
-- -.004 
(p=.70) 
-.008 
(p=.570) 
.278*** 
(p=.001) 
.0003 
(p=.978) 
Democratic 
change 
-0.019***  
(p=.006) 
-.017** 
(p=.019) 
-.020** 
(p=.017) 
-.014 
(p=.211) 
.134* 
(p=.05) 
-.019** 
(p=.018) 
Military 
government 
-.144 
(p=.148) 
-.267** 
(p=.020) 
-.243* 
(p=.052) 
.054 
(p=.650) 
-- -.236* 
(p=.067) 
Truth 
commission 
.436** 
(p=.025) 
-- .349* 
(p=.083) 
.105 
(p=.558) 
.299 
(p=.263) 
.360 
(p=.116) 
Criminal trials  .023 
(p=.814) 
-- .038 
(p=.717) 
.079 
(p=.649) 
.223** 
(p=.018) 
.037 
(p=.734) 
Logged Total 
fractionalization 
.440* 
(p=.089) 
-- .061 
(p=.932) 
-.097 
(p=.837) 
3.97*** 
(p=.001) 
-.243 
(p=.731) 
Logged 
GDP/capita 
-.235 
(p=.354) 
-- .111 
(p=.811) 
-.598* 
(p=.069) 
-.386 
(p=.217) 
.169 
(p=.731) 
Logged 
population 
-.845* 
(p=.055) 
-- .019 
(p=.983) 
-.189 
(p=.884) 
-1.92*** 
(p=.001) 
.413 
(p=.648) 
Overseas 
development 
assistance/GDP 
.372 
(p=.600) 
-- 1.35* 
(p=.096) 
-.045 
(p=.962) 
-10.32*** 
(p=.001) 
1.37* 
(p=.085) 
Civil war  -.207** 
(p=.044) 
-- .006 
(p=.960) 
-.237* 
(p=.065) 
-1.04*** 
(p=.000) 
.038 
(p=.757) 
Interstate war  -.255** 
(p=.034) 
-- -.021 
(p=.809) 
-.521*** 
(p=.000) 
.090* 
(p=.097) 
-.005 
(p=.953) 
Rule of Law  1.83** 
(p=.020) 
-- -.631 
(p=.643) 
.340 
(p=.557) 
.497 
(p=.158) 
-.217 
(p=.871) 
Country fixed 
Effects 
yes yes  yes yes  yes  yes 
Yr. fixed effects  yes  yes  yes yes  yes  yes 
Observations  1890  746 684 756 434 684 
#  of  countries  140  55 51 59 28 51 
R-squared  0.767 0.724 .725  0.580 0.881 0.715 
Results of Two-Stages Least Squares regression; Instrumented: ICCPR obligation.  Instruments:  
All explanatory variables above, plus ratification procedures, common law legal tradition, regional ICCPR 
obligation density, a counting vector of years without ICCPR ratification, three cubic splines, and a year 
time trend. 44 
Robust p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%45 
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Table 4:  ICCPR, the Optional Protocol, and the Death Penalty 
Instrumental variable regression model 
Dependent variable: De jure death penalty 
 
 Model  1: 
Basic: 
Model 2 
Domestic 
Political 
Controls: 
Model 3: 
Security 
controls: 
Model 4 
Regional 
influences 
ICCPR 
ratification 
-.036 
(p=.456) 
-.082*** 
(p=.008) 
-.081 
(p=.157) 
-.018 
(p=.741) 
Optional 
Protocol 
ratification 
-.09*** 
(p=.010) 
-.112** 
(p=.027) 
-.100*** 
(p=.008) 
-.073* 
(p=.096) 
Death penalty  
(t-1) 
.853*** 
(p=.000) 
.817*** 
(p=.000) 
.850*** 
(p=.000) 
.861*** 
(p=.000) 
Years since last 
execution 
.040*** 
(p=.005) 
.048*** 
(p=.008) 
.030** 
(p=.019) 
.039*** 
(p=.004) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
.141** 
(p=.011) 
.009 
(p=.576) 
.071*** 
(p=.008) 
-.026 
(p=.517) 
Trade as GDP 
share 
-.0002 
(p=.117) 
-.0002 
(p=.151) 
-.00007 
(p=.515) 
-.0002 
(p=.209) 
Democracy --  .0007 
(p=.454) 
--  
Yearly change in 
democracy 
-- .0004 
(p=.574) 
--  
Military 
government 
-- -.017* 
(p=.090) 
--  
Federalism   --  -.003 
(p=.423) 
--  
Left government  --  -.014 
(p=.205) 
--  
Civil  war  -- -- -.007 
(p=.456) 
 
Civil war 
experience 
  .090*** 
(p=.006) 
 
Interstate  war  -- -- .0004 
(p=.930) 
 
Logged yrs since 
independence 
-- -- .002 
(p=.767) 
 
Membership in 
Council of 
Europe (t+3) 
-- -- -- -.002 
(p=.938) 
Regional death 
penalty density 
(t-1) 
-- -- -- .039 
(p=.312) 
Europe     .0007 
(p=.992) 
Islam     -.035 47 
(p=.559) 
Country fixed 
effects? 
yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year fixed 
effects? 
yes  yes  yes  yes 
# of observations  4598  3033  4444  4598 
# of countries  170  149  169  170 
R
2  .94 .94 .95 .94 
 
*=significant at .10 level  **=significant at .05 level ***=significant at .01 level 
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Table 5: 
Death Penalty Abolition 
Instrumental variable regression model 
Dependent variable first year of Death Penalty Abolition 
 
 Model  1: 
Basic: 
Model 2 
Domestic 
Political 
Controls: 
Model 3: 
Security 
controls: 
Model 4 
Regional 
influences 
Model 5 
full set of  
controls 
ICCPR 
ratification 
.078 
(p=.181) 
.065 
(p=.195) 
.114 
(p=.127) 
.080 
(p=.180) 
.084** 
(p=.050) 
Optional 
Protocol 
ratification 
.315** 
(p=.048) 
.524* 
(p=.092) 
.333* 
(p=.051) 
.317* 
(p=.057) 
.558 
(p=.126) 
Years since last 
execution 
--   -.023 
(p=.116) 
 -.041** 
(p=.036) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
 -.249*** 
(p=.000) 
   -.271*** 
(p=.002) 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
     -.843*** 
(p=.000) 
Language 
Fractionalization 
     .672*** 
(p=.000) 
Trade as GDP 
share 
     .0004 
(p=.078)* 
Democracy   -.0005 
(p=.616) 
   -.002* 
(p=.053) 
Yearly change in 
democracy 
 -.001 
(p=.405) 
   -.002 
(p=.162) 
Military 
government 
 .014 
(p=.138) 
   .0057 
(p=.499) 
Federalism     .003 
(P=.414) 
   .0008 
(p=.826) 
Left government    .017 
(P=.246) 
   .022 
(p=.215) 
Civil war      .005 
(p=.675) 
 .004 
(p=.735) 
Civil war 
experience 
  -.020 
(p=.157) 
 -.123*** 
(p=.000) 
Interstate war      .003 
(p=.702) 
 .008 
(p=.245) 
Logged yrs since 
independence 
  .003 
(p=.724) 
 -.011 
(p=.691) 
Membership in 
Council of 
Europe (t+3) 
   .0006 
(p=.986) 
.011 
(p=.860) 
Regional death 
penalty density 
(t-1) 
   -.066 
(p=.548) 
-.124 
(p=.498) 
Europe     .047 
(p=.399) 
-- 49 
Islam     .019 
(p=.318) 
.262*** 
(p=.000) 
Log  GDP/capita       .005 
(p=.788) 
Year     -.003 
(p=.120) 
  
Country fixed 
effects? 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year fixed 
effects? 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
# of observations  5048  2695  4293  4883  2298 
# of countries  165  134  159  164  123 
R
2 .020  .084  .0007  .003  .097 
*=significant at .10 level  **=significant at .05 level ***=significant at .01 level 50 
 
References: 
 
 
Albrecht, H.-J. 2000. The Death Penalty in China from a European Perspective. In Eu-
China Human Rights Dialogue : Proceedings of the Second Eu-China Legal 
Expert Seminar Held in Beijing on 19 and 20 October 1998, edited by Manfred 
Nowak and Chunying Xin, 95-118. Wien: Verlag Österreich. 
Allain, J., and A. O'Shea. 2002. African Disunity: Comparing Human Rights Law and 
Practice of North and South African States. Human Rights Quarterly 24(1): 86-
125. 
Ancel, Marc. 1962. The Death Penalty in European Countries. Edited by European 
Committee on Crime Problems. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. 
Asian Human Rights Commission. 2000. Decline of Fair Trial in Asia : Papers from an 
Asian Seminar on Fair Trial, 7-12 November 1999, Kwoloon, Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong: Asian Human Rights Commission. 
Augusto Cancado, Antonio. 1997. The Right to a Fair Trial under the American 
Convention on Human Rights. In The Right to Fair Trial in International & 
Comparative Perspective, edited by Andrew Byrnes, 4-12. Hong Kong: Centre 
for Comparative and Public Law University of Hong Kong. 
Badawi El-Sheikh, Ibrahim Ali. 1997. Preliminary Remarks on the Right to a Fair Trial 
under the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. In The Right to a Fair 
Trial, edited by David S. Weissbrodt and Rüdiger Wolfrum, 327-40. Berlin ; New 
York: Springer. 
Bantekas, Ilias , and Peter Hodgkinson. 2000. Capital Punishment at the United Nations: 
Recent Developments Criminal Law Forum 11(1): 23-34. 
Baumer, Eric P, Steven F Messner, and Richard Rosenfeld. 2003. Explaining Spatial 
Variation in Support for Capital Punishment: A Multilevel Analysis American 
Journal of Sociology 108(4): 844–75. 
Beccaria, Cesare. 1963. On Crimes and Punishments, The Library of Liberal Arts, 107. 
Indianapolis,: Bobbs-Merrill. 
Beyer, Peter. 2003. Constitutional Privilege and Constituting Pluralism: Religious 
Freedom in National, Global, and Legal Context. Journal for the Scientific Study 
of Religion 42(3): 333-39. 
Block, Brian P., and John Hostettler. 1997. Hanging in the Balance : A History of the 
Abolition of Capital Punishment in Britain. Winchester: Waterside Press. 
Bodenhamer, David J. 1992. Fair Trial : Rights of the Accused in American History, 
Bicentennial Essays on the Bill of Rights. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Boulanger, Christian, and Austin Sarat. 2005. Putting Culture into the Picture: Toward a 
Comparative Analysis of State Killing. In The Cultural Lives of Capital 
Punishment : Comparative Perspectives, edited by Austin Sarat and Christian 
Boulanger, 1-45. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
Bowers, William J., Glenn L. Pierce, John F. McDevitt, and William J. Bowers. 1984. 
Legal Homicide : Death as Punishment in America, 1864-1982. Boston: 
Northeastern University Press. 51 
Brems, Eva. 2006. Article 14 : The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and 
Religion, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,. Leiden ; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Cameron, Samuel. 1993. The Demand for Capital Punishment. International Review of 
Law & Economics 13(1): 47-59. 
Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law, ed. 2000. The 
Right to a Fair Trial, Collection Science and Technique of Democracy ; No. 28. 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub. 
Danilenko, Gennady M, and William Burnham. 2000. Law and Legal System of the 
Russian Federation. 2nd ed. [Yonkers, N.Y.]: Juris Pub. 
Davis, David Brion. 1957. The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 
1787-1861. The American Historical Review 63(1): 23-46. 
Davis, Derek H. 2002. The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right: 
Examining the Role of the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 
Brigham You University Law Review: 217-36. 
De Neufville, Judith Innes. 1986. Human-Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool - an 
Examination of the State-Department Country Reports. Human Rights Quarterly 
8(4): 681-99. 
De Zayas, Alfred M. 1997. The United Nations and the Guarantees of a Fair Trial in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In The 
Right to a Fair Trial, edited by David S. Weissbrodt and Rüdiger Wolfrum, 669-
96. Berlin ; New York: Springer. 
De Zayas, Alfred M., Jakob Moller, and Torkel Opsahl. 1985. Application of the Iccpr 
under the Optional Protocol by the Human Rights Committee. German Yearbook 
of International Law 28: 9-64. 
Donnelly, Jack. 1998. International Human Rights. 2nd ed, Dilemmas in World Politics. 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 
Dunér, Bertil, and Hanna  Geurtsen. 2002. The Death Penalty and War. International 
Journal of Human Rights 6(4): 1-28. 
Durham, W. Cole Jr., and Lauren B Homer. 1998. Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Associations: An Analytical Appraisal. Emory 
International Law Review. 
Editorial. 1998. Religious Persecution in Today's Germany: Old Habits Renewed. 
Journal of Church & State 40(4): 741. 
Ehrlich, Isaac. 1975. The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and 
Death. The American Economic Review 65(3): 397-417. 
Ekirch, A. Roger. 1987. Bound for America : The Transportation of British Convicts to 
the Colonies, 1718-1775. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Ellmann, Stephen. 1998. Cause Lawyering in the Third World. In Cause Lawyering : 
Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, edited by Austin Sarat 
and Stuart A. Scheingold, 349-430. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. 2007. Human Rights. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 
Evans, Carolyn M. 2002. Chinese Law and the International Protection of Religious 
Freedom. Journal of Church and State 44: 749-. 52 
Fawn, Rick. 2001. Death Penalty as Democratization: Is the Council of Europe Hanging 
Itself? Democratization 8(2): 69 - 96. 
Fijalkowski, Agata. 2005. Capital Punishment in Poland: An Aspect of the 'Cultural Life' 
of Death Penalty Discourse. In The Cultural Lives of Capital Punishment : 
Comparative Perspectives, edited by Austin Sarat and Christian Boulanger, 147-
68. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
Forsythe, David P. 1985. The United Nations and Human Rights. Political Science 
Quarterly 100(2): 249-69. 
Fox, Jonathan. 2004. The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict 
and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001. Journal of Peace Research 41(6): 715-31. 
Froese, Paul. 2004. After Atheism: An Analysis of Religious Monopolies in the Post-
Communist World. Sociology of Religion 65(1): 57-75. 
Frymer, Paul. 2003. Acting When Elected Officials Won't: Federal Courts and Civil 
Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935–85. American Political Science 
Review 97(3): 483-99. 
Garland, David. 2001. The Culture of Control : Crime and Social Order in Contemporary 
Society. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Garland, David W. 2002. The Cultural Uses of Capital Punishment. Punishment & 
Society 4(4): 459-87. 
Gatrell, V. A. C. 1994. The Hanging Tree : Execution and the English People 1770-1868. 
Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ghandhi, P.R. 1986. The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual 
Communication. In British Year Book of International Law, 201-51. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Hall, John R. 2003. Religion and Violence:Social Processes in Comparative Perspective. 
In Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, edited by Michele Dillon, xiii, 481. 
Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hannum, Hurst. 1991. Contemporary Developments in the Lnternational Protection of 
the Rights of Minorities. Notre Dame Law Review 66. 
Hathaway, Oona. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Yale Law 
Journal: 101-99. 
Heffernan, Liz. 1997. A Comparative View of Individual Petition Procedures under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. Human Rights Quarterly 19(1): 78-112. 
Helfer, Laurence R, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 1997. Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication. Yale Law Journal 107(2): 273-391. 
Henkin, Louis. 1981. The International Bill of Rights : The Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 1995. International Law: Politics and Values. Vol. 18, Developments in 
International Law. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Ho, Virgil K Y. 2005. What Is Wrong with Capital Punishment?  Official and Unofficial 
Attitudes toward Capital Ppunishment in Modern and Contemporary China. In 
The Cultural Lives of Capital Punishment : Comparative Perspectives, edited by 
Austin Sarat and Christian Boulanger, 274-90. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press. 53 
Hood, Roger. 2001. Capital Punishment: A Global Perspective Punishment & Society 
3(3): 331-54. 
Humphrey, John P. 1984. Political and Related Rights. In Human Rights in International 
Law : Legal and Policy Issues, edited by Theodor Meron, 2 v. (566 ). Oxford 
[Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press. 
Ishay, Micheline. 2004. The History of Human Rights : From Ancient Times to the 
Globalization Era. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Jacobs, David, and Jason T Carmichael. 2004. Ideology, Social Threat, and the Death 
Sentence: Capital Sentences across Time and Space. Social Forces 83(1): 249-78. 
———. 2002. The Political Sociology of the Death Penalty: A Pooled Time-Series 
Analysis. American Sociological Review 67(1): 109-31. 
Jacobs, David, and Ronald Helms. 1997. Testing Coercive Explanations for Order: The 
Determinants of Law Enforcement Strength over Time. Social Forces 75(4): 
1361-92. 
Jayawickrama, Nihal. 1997. The Right to a Fair Trial under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. In The Right to Fair Trial in International & 
Comparative Perspective, edited by Andrew Byrnes, 37-67. Hong Kong: Centre 
for Comparative and Public Law University of Hong Kong. 
Johnson, David T. 2006. Where the State Kills in Secret: Capital Punishment in Japan. 
Punishment & Society 8(3): 251-85. 
Keith, Linda Camp. 1999. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior? Journal 
of Peace Research 36(1): 95-118. 
Kim, Hunjoon , and Kathryn  Sikkink. 2007. Do Human Rights Trials Make a 
Difference? In Presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association. Chicago. 
Koh, Harold H. 1991. Transnational Public Law Litigation. Yale Law Journal 100: 2347. 
Kokott, Juliane B. 1997. Fair Trial - the Inter-American System. In The Right to a Fair 
Trial, edited by David S. Weissbrodt and Rüdiger Wolfrum, 133-62. Berlin ; New 
York: Springer. 
Kolodner, Eric. 1994. Religious Rights in China: A Comparison of International Human 
Rights Law and Chinese Domestic Legislation. Human Rights Quarterly 16: 455-
90. 
Leigh, Leonard H. 1997. The Right to a Fair Trial and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In The Right to a Fair Trial, edited by David S. Weissbrodt and 
Rüdiger Wolfrum, 645-68. Berlin ; New York: Springer. 
Lerner, Natan. 2000. Religion, Beliefs, and International Human Rights, Religion and 
Human Rights Series. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books. 
———. 2006. Religion, Secular Beliefs, and Human Rights : 25 Years after the 1981 
Declaration, Studies in Religion, Secular Beliefs, and Human Rights, V. 2. Leiden 
; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
———. 1996. Religious Human Rights under the United Nations. In Religious Human 
Rights in Global Perspective : Legal Perspectives, edited by J. D. Van der Vyver 
and John Witte, 79-134. The Hague: M. Nijhoff Publishers. 54 
Lillich, Richard B. 1984. Civil Rights. In Human Rights in International Law : Legal and 
Policy Issues, edited by Theodor Meron, 2 v. (566 ). Oxford [Oxfordshire]: 
Clarendon Press. 
Linebaugh, Peter. 1991. The London Hanged : Crime and Civil Society in the 18th 
Century. London: Allen Lane : The Penguin Press. 
Little, David. 1996. Studying 'Religious Human Rights': Methodological  Foundations. In 
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective : Legal Perspectives, edited by J. 
D. Van der Vyver and John Witte, 45-77. The Hague: M. Nijhoff Publishers. 
Livezey, Lowell W. 1989. Us Religious Organizations and the International Human 
Rights Movement. Human Rights Quarterly 11(1): 14-81. 
Martin, William. 1999. The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy. Foreign 
Policy(114): 66-80. 
Matscher, Franz. 2000. The Right to a Fair Trial in the Case-Law of the Organs of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In The Right to a Fair Trial, edited by 
European Commission for Democracy through Law Council of Europe, 10-23. 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub. 
McGoldrick, Dominic. 1991. The Human Rights Committee. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Merry, Sally Engle. 2006. Human Rights and Gender Violence : Translating 
International Law into Local Justice, Chicago Series in Law and Society. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Miethe, Terance D., Hong Lu, and Gini R. Deibert. 2005. Cross-National Variability in 
Capital Punishment: Exploring the Sociopolitical Sources of Its Differential Legal 
Status. International Criminal Justice Review 15(2): 115-30. 
Mohamad, Maznah. 2002. Towards a Human Rights Regime in Southeast Asia: Charting 
the Course of State Commitment. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of 
International & Strategic Affairs 24(2): 230. 
Myullerson, Rein. 1992. Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights 
Standards: Experience of the Un Human Rights Committee. In Canadian Human 
Rights Yearbook, 1991-1992, 105-18. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Human 
Rights Research and Education Centre. 
North, Charles M., and Carl R. Gwin. 2004. Religious Freedom and the Unintended 
Consequences of State Religion. Southern Economic Journal 71(1): 103-17. 
Odio Benito, Elizabeth. 1989. Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Edited by United Nations Centre for 
Human Rights., Human Rights Study Series, 2. New York: United Nations. 
Ohlin, Jens David 2005. Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of Genocide. The 
American Journal of International Law 99(4): 747-77. 
Osofsky, H. M. 1997. Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing Human 
Rights Violators to Justice. Yale Law Journal 107(1): 191-226. 
Otterbein, Keith F. 1986. The Ultimate Coercive Sanction : A Cross-Cultural Study of 
Capital Punishment. New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press. 
Palmer, John P., and John  Henderson. 1998. The Economics of Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment  European Journal of Law and Economics 5(3): 235-45. 
Partsch, Karl Josef. 1981. Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political 
Freedoms. In The International Bill of Rights : The Covenant on Civil and 55 
Political Rights, edited by Louis Henkin, x, 523. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Perry, Michael J. 2007. Toward a Theory of Human Rights : Religion, Law, Courts. 
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Potter, Harry. 1993. Hanging in Judgment : Religion and the Death Penalty in England. 
New York: Continuum. 
Potter, Pitman B. 2003. Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China. The China 
Quarterly 174: 317-37. 
Puhar, Eva. 2005. The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Central and Eastern Europe: A 
Survey of Abolition Processes in Former Communist Countries. In Occasional 
Papers Series Vol. II. Centre for Capital Punishment Studies: University of 
Westminster. 
Radzinowicz, Leon. 1999. Adventures in Criminology. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Ribeiro. 1987. Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. edited by United 
Nations. 
Riis, Ole. 1999. Modes of Religious Pluralism under Conditions of Globalisation. 
International Journal on Multicultural Societies 1(1): 20-34. 
Roan, Michael. 1996. The Role of Secular Non-Governmental Organizations in the 
Cultivation and Understanding of Religious Human Rights. In Religious Human 
Rights in Global Perspective : Legal Perspectives, edited by J. D. Van der Vyver 
and John Witte, 135-59. The Hague: M. Nijhoff Publishers. 
Ruddell, Rick. 2005. Social Disruption, State Formation and Minority Threat: A 
Crossnational Study of Imprisonment. Punishment & Society 7(7-28). 
Ruddell, Rick, and Martin G. Urbana. 2004. Minority Threat and Punishment: A Cross-
National Analysis. Justice Quarterly 21(4): 903-31. 
Sangroula, Yubaraj. 2000. Fair Trial: Still a Long Way to Achieve in Nepal. In Decline of 
Fair Trial in Asia : Papers from an Asian Seminar on Fair Trial, 7-12 November 
1999, Kwoloon, Hong Kong, edited by Asian Human Rights Commission. and 
Danske menneskerettighedscenter., 195-215. Hong Kong: Asian Human Rights 
Commission. 
Schabas, William. 2002. The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law. 3rd ed. 
Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
Shapiro, Steven R. 1993. Human Rights Violations in the United States : A Report on 
U.S. Compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Edited by Human Rights Watch (Organization) and American Civil Liberties 
Union. New York: Human Rights Watch : American Civil Liberties Union. 
Sharif, Adel Omar. 2000. The Rule of Law in Egypt from a Judicial Perspective : A 
Digest of the Landmark Decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court. In The 
Rule of Law in the Middle East and the Islamic World : Human Rights and the 
Judicial Process, edited by Eugene Cotran and Mai  Yamani, 1-34. London: I.B. 
Tauris. 
Sieghart, Paul. 1983. The International Law of Human Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Sigmund, Paul E. 1996. Religious Human Rights in Latin America. In Religious Human 
Rights in Global Perspective : Legal Perspectives, edited by J. D. Van der Vyver 
and John Witte, 467-81. The Hague: M. Nijhoff Publishers. 56 
Simmons, Beth A. forthcoming. International Human Rights: Law Politics and 
Accountability. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Skeen, Andrew. 2000. The Right to a Fair Trial in South African Law. In The Right to a 
Fair Trial, edited by European Commission for Democracy through Law Council 
of Europe, 110-29. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub. 
Soss, Joe, Laura Langbein, and Alan R. Metelko. 2003. Why Do White Americans 
Support the Death Penalty? The Journal of Politics 65(2): 397-421. 
Sullivan, Donna J. 1988. Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the Un 
Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination. The 
American Journal of International Law 82(3): 487-520. 
Sung, Hung-En 2006. Democracy and Criminal Justice in Cross-National Perspective: 
From Crime Control to Due Process. The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 605(1): 311 - 37. 
Sutton, John R. 2000. Imprisonment and Social Classification in Five Common-Law 
Democracies, 1955-1985. American Journal of Sociology 106(2): 350-86. 
Swinarski, Christophe. 1997. On the Right to a Fair Trial under International 
Humanitarian Instruments. In The Right to Fair Trial in International & 
Comparative Perspective, edited by Andrew Byrnes, 26-36. Hong Kong: Centre 
for Comparative and Public Law University of Hong Kong. 
Tahzib, Bahiyyih G. 1996. Freedom of Religion or Belief : Ensuring Effective 
International Legal Protection, International Studies in Human Rights ; V. 44. 
The Hague: M. Nijhoff. 
Talbi, Mohamed. 1986. Religious Liberty: Amuslim Perspective. In Religious Liberty 
and Human Rights in Nations and in Religions, edited by Leonard J Swidler, 175-
87. Philadelphia: Ecumenical Press. 
Taylor, Paul M. 2005. Freedom of Religion : Un and European Human Rights Law and 
Practice. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Tolley, Howard. 1991. Interest Group Litigation to Enforce Human-Rights. Political 
Science Quarterly 105(4): 617-38. 
Tshosa, Onkemetse. 2001. National Law and International Human Rights Law : Cases of 
Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe, Law, Social Change, and Development 
Series. Aldershot ; Burlington, USA: Ashgate. 
Turrell, Robert Vicat. 2004. White Mercy : A Study of the Death Penalty in South Africa. 
Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 
van Dijk, Pieter. 1983. The Right of the Accused to a Fair Trial under International Law. 
Edited by Studie- en Informatiecentrum Mensenrechten (Netherlands), Sim 
Special ; No. 1. Utrecht, The Netherlands: Studie- en Informatiecentrum 
Mensenrechten. 
Weissbrodt, David, and Mattias Hallendorff. 1999. Travaux Preparatoires of the Fair 
Trial Provisions - Articles 8 to 11 - of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Human Rights Quarterly 21(4): 1061-96. 
Weissbrodt, David S. 2001. The Right to a Fair Trial under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ; 1. The Hague: M. Nijhoff. 
Whitman, James Q. 2003. Harsh Justice : Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide 
between America and Europe. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 57 
Wolpin, Kenneth I. 1978. Capital Punishment and Homicide in England: A Summary of 
Results. The American Economic Review 68(2): 422-27. 
Wyman, James H. 1997. Vengeance Is Whose?: The Death Penalty and Cultural 
Relativism in International Law. Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 6(2): 
543-70. 
Wynarczyk, Peter. 1999. The Political Economy of Capital Punishment. Economic 
Affairs 19(1): 43-47. 
Zimring, Franklin E. 2003. The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment, Studies 
in Crime and Public Policy. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
 